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ABSTRACT
Police departments in American cities were significantly 
affected by a number of reform movements during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like other urban reform 
movements of the period, these emerged in response to changing 
social conditions within the nation's cities. The goal of the 
police reformers was to eliminate the variety of social and 
political services that the police had traditionally provided and 
to create a new force whose exclusive function would be to provide 
efficient and impartial enforcement of the law. Reformers 
eventually came to believe that adequate levels of efficiency and 
impartiality could only be maintained if police departments 
adopted organizational structures that concentrated 
decision-making power in the hands of a single chief executive and 
that enabled the department to function with a minimum of outside 
interference. Furthermore, the new role required that all members 
of the department commit themselves to a new ethic of professional 
behavior.
Groups whose interests were more likely to be advanced by a 
continuation of the policemen's traditional role opposed the 
implementation of the reformers' ideas. In many cities, this led 
to a period of struggle for control of the police department. In 
most cases, reformers, with the assistance of other interest 
groups, were able to gain the upper hand in these struggles, and 
so, by World War I, many urban police departments had been 
reorganized along the lines promoted by the reformers. Throughout 
this period of struggle and reform, however, neither the reformers 
nor their opponents showed much concern about the interests of the 
rank-and-file patrolmen. In fact, many of the reforms that were 
implemented during this period proved to be detrimental to the 
policemen's interests.
This paper discusses the impact that police reform had on the 
Boston Police Department and the role that these reforms played in 
generating the conflicts that culminated in the Boston Police 
Strike of 1919. During the early twentieth century, Boston adopted 
many of the ideas of the reformers. At the same time that police 
reformers were promoting Boston's police department as a model to 
be emulated by other American police forces, however, growing 
dissatisfaction among the city's patrolmen, much of it caused by 
conditions that resulted directly or indirectly from the 
implementation of these reforms, was creating a crisis within the 
department. Furthermore, the administrative structures that had 
been adopted in response to the reform movement created obstacles 
that limited the city officials' ability to resolve the conflicts 
within the department and to avert the impending crisis. In the 
end, this crisis resulted in a temporary break-down of the 
mechanisms upon which the city depended for the maintenance of law 
and order.
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POLICE REFORM AND THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE OF 1919
INTRODUCTION
During the half century between 1870 and 1920, American 
society underwent a transformation that resulted in the 
establishment of an entirely new social order. Just as the rapid 
growth of American industry forever altered the nation's economic 
landscape, the accompanying emergence of large urban centers gave 
rise to social patterns that diverged dramatically from those that 
had existed previously. The shift to large-scale industrial 
production and the Increased wealth that this production 
generated, together with the development of corporations with 
their hierarchical ackninistratlve structures, created new social 
classes. Urban life imposed fundamental changes on the ways social 
groups interacted with one another. The concentration of growing 
numbers of people in the nation's cities and the arrival of 
ever-increasing numbers of immigrants injected new values, new 
outlooks and new ambitions into American culture. A transformation 
of such magnitude naturally put a tremendous strain on the 
society. Conflict erupted not only between the old and the new, 
but also among the various components that made up the new social 
order. As a result, this period was not simply one of profound 
change; it was also a time of nearly constant adjustment and 
readjustment to the new conditions that these changes produced.
All of the social groups with interests in the new urban 
society expected the city police to play a role in this process of 
adjustment. Since each group pursued a different set of goals, 
however, each held a different view of Just what the police
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force's proper role was to be. Machine politicians were quick to 
recognize that the large number of Jobs available within the 
police department, along with the policeman's power to determine 
when and against whom to enforce the law, constituted valuable 
commodities that could be traded whenever it was necessary to 
gather votes or financial contributions. Conversely, rural 
conservatives saw the police as the last bulwark against a 
complete take-over of municipal affairs by these same "undesirable 
elements", whose influence grew in proportion to the size of the 
working-class populations from which they drew their support. To 
the working class Itself, the police department offered stable 
jobs and, hence, opportunities for financial security and social 
mobility. To the industrialist, however, the power exercised by 
the police force gave it great potential as a means of controlling 
the working class and defending private property, especially 
during labor disputes. The middle-class moralists viewed the 
police force as the most potent weapon in their continuous war on 
vice, while to yet another group of reformers, the civic reformers 
of the day, the police constituted an essential component in the 
new municipal administrative structure that they hoped to create, 
a structure that they were confident would bring order, efficiency 
and an impartial distribution of the benefits of society to urban 
America. While these groups held conflicting views of the 
policeman's appropriate role In the new urban society and, 
consequently, made widely divergent demands on the police force, 
one thing was understood by all: the group that controlled the
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police department would get to define the departments role. As a 
result* police history during this period Is largely the story of 
the competition for control that was waged by the various Interest 
groups within the urban society.
No single group ever managed to gain complete control over 
the police during this period. However* by 1910 civic reformers 
had replaced machine politicians as the group that exercised the 
greatest influence over the development of many city police 
departments. Through a series of reforms designed to make police 
departments more efficient* to free them from the influence of 
other groups and to professionalize both police work and the 
policeman* these reformers significantly altered both the 
administrative structure of the police force and the function that 
the police served within the community. They likewise altered the 
patrolman's own perception of his work. These reformers, however, 
like the others who vied for control of the police department* 
rarely devoted any attention to the needs and desires of the 
policeman himself. Each of these groups, in fact, viewed the 
policeman as little more than a functionary who was expected to 
compliantly assist in the accomplishment of the group's own 
particular alms. As a result, the police reforms of the period 
frequently created situations that threatened the interests of the 
policeman.
Boston was one of the many American cities whose police were 
significantly affected by succeeding waves of police reform. 
Between 1875 and the beginning of World War I, the Boston Police
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Department was subjected to numerous changes, each of which was 
touted by Its promoters as an essential prerequisite for Improving 
the department's performance. By 1915, reformers rated Boston's 
police force one of the most effective and least corrupt In the 
nation.1 However, the very conditions that won such praise for the 
Boston Police Department also contributed to the increasing 
dissatisfaction of the city's policemen. In fact, not only did 
these reforms add to the patrolmen's growing list of complaints, 
but they also created conditions that severely limited the 
policemen's ability to secure acceptable redress of their 
grievances. At the same time, these reforms sparked a growing 
occupational awareness that intensified the patrolmen's 
determination to find solutions to these problems.
By 1919, this frustration was compounded by concern over 
postwar inflation and the resulting deterioration of the 
patrolmen's economic position. Determined to find a way to improve 
their situation, the policemen of Boston sought assistance from a 
source that had supported numerous other members of the working 
class in their quest for a better life: they decided to form a 
union and to seek affiliation with the American Federation of 
Labor. Uncompromising opposition from local authorities failed to 
deter the policemen from proceeding with these plans. During the 
crisis that ensued, the administrative patterns established by the 
earlier reforms again came into play in a way that significantly 
hampered city officials' attempts to diffuse the situation. These 
events culminated in a strike by the policemen in September 1919.
5
In the wake of this strike, the once acclaimed Boston Police 
Department was left In ruins, and the organization of a new force 
was begun.
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CHAPTER I
POLICE REFORM IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
STATE CONTROL
The only way for a particular group to ensure that the police 
performed those functions that the group deemed appropriate was 
for that group to see to it that those who ran the police 
department were sympathetic to the group's goals. Hence, police 
reform during the late 1800's and early 1900's focused more 
attention on the administrative structure of the force than on any 
other single issue. In Boston, as in many other cities, this 
resulted in repeated reorganization of the command structure and 
in frequent attempts to redefine the police department's 
relationship with local and state authorities. As each succeeding 
group came to the fore, it altered the acbnlnistrative structure of 
the department in ways that were designed to facilitate the 
promotion of that group's own alms and, at the same time, to 
minimize the amount of influence that competing groups could 
exercise over the police. The first wave of reform occurred 
between 1875 and 1890, when the state government assumed control 
over the Boston Police Department. The second period of reform 
began after 1900. By 1910, however, the restructuring came to an 
end, and the administrative patterns that were to continue until 
the 1960's were firmly in place.
By the mid-1800's, police departments had come to play a 
central role in the operation of local political machines in most
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large American cities. Distribution of the large number of Jobs 
available within the police department provided the party boss 
with one of his most Important sources of patronage. Since 
patrolmen were often appointed on a yearly basis, and since 
continuance in their Jobs depended upon their loyalty to those who 
had appointed them, the existence of a large police force 
automatically generated significant numbers of votes and financial 
contributions for the party in power. Furthermore, the policeman's 
position within the community, especially within the working-class 
districts, helped to win support for the party machine. By 
providing services that ranged from the provision of free food and 
lodging for the indigent to the return of lost children, the 
policeman was a symbol of the party boss's benevolence and concern 
for the welfare of his constituents. At election time, the police 
force could be put to work canvassing the neighborhoods for votes. 
However, it was the tremendous discretionary power exercised by 
the policeman on his beat, his ability to decide when to enforce 
the law and when to look the other way, that made him a more 
valuable ally than any other municipal worker in the machine 
politician's quest for electoral support and in his bid to reduce 
the power of his rivals.1
Until the 1870's, the Boston Police Department was 
administered by a chief of police who was appointed Jointly by the 
mayor and the board of aldermen and was then supervised by a 
committee that consisted of several of the aldermen. Such direct 
control by city officials, typical of mid-nineteenth century
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police departments, enabled party bosses to regulate the 
activities of the police through their control of the city 
government. However, In Boston and in many other cities, this 
pattern of police actainlstration eventually came under attack from 
a number of different sources. Opponents of the party machines 
sought to break the bosses/ hold on the police departments, and 
civic reformers throughout the United States, pointing out that 
city council members were often saloon keepers or others whom the 
police were expected to control, argued for a system that would 
encourage more impartial enforcement of the law. In Boston, social 
reformers were very critical of the social welfare functions that 
the police performed, insisting that the police were encouraging 
pauperism and Interfering with the reformers' efforts to identify 
and help the "deserving poor" by indiscriminately providing soup 
and lodging for vagrants. As a result, proponents of change in 
Boston and in many other cities launched movements to place the 
police under the control of special police boards whose membership 
would not overlap with that of the city council. Advocates of such 
plans argued that the creation of a police board to replace a 
single chief of police would also prevent the concentration of 
power in the hands of one acininistrator and would thus reduce the 
likelihood of corruption, favoritism or control by machine 
politicians. The city of Philadelphia established such a system in 
1850. Many other large American cities soon followed suit, 
including New York (1853), New Orleans (1853), Cincinnati (1859), 
San Francisco (1859), Saint Louis (1861), Kansas City (1861),
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Detroit (1861), Buffalo (1866), Cleveland (1866) and Atlanta 
(1874). Boston was one of the last cities to adopt this type of 
acinin1strative structure. In 1878, the legislature of 
Massachusetts created a three-member board of police commissioners 
to run the Boston Police Department. The commissioners were to be 
appointed by the mayor of the city with the consent of the board 
of aldermen. In addition to administering the police department, 
this board was also given the power to distribute liquor licenses, 
a power that had previously been exercised by the board of
aldermen.2
This move, however, did not satisfy the critics in most 
cities for long. Party bosses, through their ability to control 
the municipal officials who appointed the police boards, continued 
to determine the role that the police played within the city, so 
the conditions that had existed before the establishment of the 
boards persisted. Charitable organizations continued to complain 
that police activities undermined their work and opponents of the 
local party machines continued to resent the power that control 
over the police department gave to the party boss. In Boston, 
reform groups like the New England Society for the Suppression of 
Vice and the Citizens' Law and Order League of Massachusetts 
attacked the police department's laxity in enforcing liquor laws 
and in fighting prostitution and gambling, blaming this laxity on 
the influence of city politicians. In its 1884 report, the New 
England Society called for "a radical and thorough reform of our 
police system."3 Opponents of the Democratic machine that
10
dominated Boston politics by this time were likewise dissatisfied 
with the results of the restructuring. One Republican insisted,
"It is CasJ certain that the force will be used for partisan 
purposes as It is that the mayor is a politician. Who ever knew of 
a Democratic politician to lose such an opportunity?*4
Many of these critics began to believe that the only way to 
remedy this situation was to remove the police force from the 
control of municipal officials altogether. Reform groups like the 
New England Society and the Law and Order League began to agitate 
for a transfer of control from the city government to the state 
level. These groups argued that state control would remove the 
influence of partisan politics from the operation of the police 
force and hence improve the quality of law enforcement. In 1881, 
Annie Adams Fields, founder of the Associated Charities in Boston, 
wrote to the governor of Massachusetts to request that the state 
assume responsibility for appointing the city/s board of police 
commissioners, Insisting that, *our work for the poor in Boston is 
almost neutralized by the absence of help from the very source 
where we should look for it.*5
During the early 1880's, the movement to establish state 
control over the Boston Police Department gathered momentum. 
Republican leaders had by this time realized the hopelessness of 
their dreams of wresting control of the city government from a 
Democratic Party machine which drew its support from the 
ever-growing immigrant population of the city. Transferring 
control of the police department to the state government, which
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was dominated by representatives from the heavlly-Republlean rural 
areas of the state, offered them a way of maintaining at least 
some Influence over municipal affairs. Residents of rural areas 
themselves were becoming increasingly concerned as the number of 
immigrants who arrived in the city each year increased. By 1880, 
nearly one third of the population of Boston was foreign-born. The 
incorporation of such large numbers of immigrants into the city/s 
population was having a profound (and, according to the defenders 
of the old norms, a profoundly adverse) impact on the social, 
political, economic and religious life of Boston. Suspicious in 
particular of the Irish, who constituted more than 56% of the 
foreign-born population and who were coming to dominate political 
life within the city in general and the city's Democratic Party 
hierarchy in particular, rural conservatives viewed state control 
as a way to ensure that the police power remained in "safe" hands. 
Thus, the movement for state control of the Boston Police 
Department linked two groups with divergent aims: the civic and 
social reformers who hoped that state control would lead to more 
impartial and effective law enforcement and the conservative 
Republicans who saw it as a way of wresting power from the 
Democratic Party bosses.6
In the wake of the election of Boston's first Irish Catholic 
mayor, Hugh O'Brien, in 1885, the state legislature complied with 
the requests of these critics. Shortly after O'Brien appointed a 
second Irish Democrat to the three-man board of police 
commissioners, Republicans in the Massachusetts General Court
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introduced a bill to transfer the power to appoint the board of 
police commissloners to the state government. The new police board 
was to be a bipartisan body of three commissioners appointed to 
five-year terms by the governor. Since Republicans had occupied 
the governor's office for 25 of the previous 27 years, this 
effectively removed control of Boston's police force from the 
hands of the city's Democratic Party bosses. In case a Democrat 
were to somehow be elected governor, however, these appointments 
were made subject to the consent of the state's Executive Council, 
whose seats were apportioned in such a way as to ensure control by 
Republicans from outside of the city. In spite of opposition from 
Democrats, the legislature's Republican majority was able to 
secure passage of the bill before the end of 1885. A second bill 
adopted at the same time gave the state control over the city's 
finances by setting a limit on the city's tax rate and requiring 
the consent of the General Court before the tax rate could be 
changed.7 Boston Democrats protested that these measures violated 
the principle of "home rule". The Boston Globe complained,
To say that Boston has not the intelligence and 
the will to regulate her own immediate concerns is 
an insult to her citizens. The metropolis of the 
Commonwealth is robbed of one of the most 
Important functions of self-government In order to 
gratify the malice of some, the fanatical notions 
of others, and the political Interests of many 
more.8
But the Republican majority in the General Court countered such 
arguments with the assertion that the board of police 
commissioners had failed to adequately enforce the liquor laws and
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that, since a local police force held the primary responsibility 
for enforcing laws passed by the state legislature, the General 
Court had a vested Interest in seeing to it that the police 
department carried out its duties properly. A year earlier, the 
General Court had passed a civil service law designed to eliminate 
political Influence from decisions concerning the appointment of 
policemen or their tenure in office. Armed with these measures, 
reformers and Republicans were now convinced that they had finally 
broken the Democratic Party bosses7 hold over the Boston Police 
Department. Republicans were so pleased with the concept of state 
control, in fact, that over the course of the next decade they saw 
to it that the state assumed similar control over Boston's sewage, 
park and water departments.9
In states throughout the nation, rural suspicion of rapidly 
growing urban areas and the tendency for one party to control the 
city while the other controlled the hinterland led to conflicts 
similar to that which occurred in Boston. In case after case, 
legislatures dominated by representatives from rural areas removed 
city police forces and, later, other city services from the 
jurisdiction of municipal officials. Thus, when the Massachusetts 
legislature established state control over the Boston Police 
Department in 1885, it was adopting a policy that had already been 
tried in numerous other places. New York had assumed the lead 
when, in 1857, the state government assumed control over the New 
York Police Department. Over the course of the next thirty years, 
the police departments in Baltimore (1860), Saint Louis (1861),
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Kansas City (1861), Chicago (1861), Detroit (1865), Cleveland 
(1866), New Orleans (1868), Cincinnati (1877), San Francisco 
(1877), Indianapolis (1883), and Omaha (1887) were all reorganized 
along similar lines. Urban politicians in many cities, however, 
protested persistently against the state governments/ assumption 
of authority over city departments.10 In 1905, twenty years after 
the establishment of state control of the Boston Police 
Department, Mayor Patrick Andrew Collins called it a "violation of 
the first principle of home rule, and a needless and profitless 
wound to the pride of the first city in the Commonwealth.-11
State control of most city police departments was relatively 
short-lived. Contrary to the hopes of reformers, state control did 
not significantly Improve the quality of police service, nor did 
it eliminate partisan politics from police affairs; it simply 
replaced the Influence of one group of politicians with Influence 
by another. In most cities, the alliance between those reformers 
who sought more effective enforcement of the law and the partisan 
groups, who supported state control of police departments simply 
because it offered a means of reducing the power of the opposing 
political party, quickly disintegrated. Thus, reformers did not 
put up tremendous opposition when, in state after state, the party 
that dominated city politics gained control of the state 
government and restored city police departments to local control. 
Local control was re-established in New York in 1870 and in most 
other cities during the subsequent three decades. In 
Massachusetts, however, the Republican Party maintained its
15
control over the state government until the 1930's. Republicans 
occupied the governors office for all but nine of the 46 years 
between 1885 and 1931. Meanwhile the clty/s government remained 
firmly In the hands of local Democratic leaders. This encouraged 
the state government to retain Jurisdiction over the Boston Police 
Department for a far longer period than was typical in other 
cities. By 1900, only four large cities still maintained 
state-controlled police forces: Baltimore, Saint Louis, Kansas 
City and Boston. In Boston, the power to appoint police 
commissioners remained with the governor until 1962.^
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CHAPTER II
POLICE REFORM IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURYs DEPARTMENTAL 
INDEPENDENCE AND CENTRALIZATION
Urban reformers carried their campaigns for improved 
municipal government Into the new century. In fact, these 
campaigns took on an increased vigor after 1900. The reformers of 
the early twentieth century did not promote a single unified 
reform package, however. Instead, various directions and 
divergent, and often conflicting, goals can be identified within 
the urban reform movements of the period. Like many of their 
predecessors In the previous century, some reformers continued to 
focus on the eradication of vice and immorality, especially in the 
working-class districts of the city. Others argued that Improved 
education and universal schooling would eliminate much of the 
squalor in the nation's urban areas. Yet other groups insisted 
that the solutions to the city's problems lay in increased popular 
control over local government. This last group of reformers 
advocated a democratization of government through such means as 
the secret ballot, home rule, direct primaries, initiative and 
referendum. Conversely, other reformers blamed urban problems on 
the irresponsibility of the city's voters and sought ways to 
further remove the departments that provided municipal services 
from the arena of electoral politics.
This latter group believed that the success of any plan to 
improve the performance of the city government relied ultimately
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on administrative efficiency. This, they insisted, required 
decision-making by experts who would occupy public positions not 
because they were liked by the voters or loyal to the ruling 
political boss, but because they possessed specialized knowledge 
and skills that enabled them to run their respective departments 
effectively. The city government, they insisted, should be modeled 
after the actalnlstrative structures that allowed private 
businesses to be run profitably. According to these reformers, the 
proper functioning of such a system required that significant 
degrees of autonomy be granted to the heads of municipal 
departments. Not surprisingly, the leading promoters of this 
strain of reform tended to be prominent businessmen, professionals 
or members of the elite classes who had watched machine 
politicians use electoral politics to edge them out of their 
positions of control in the city.1
It was this last strain of reform that had the greatest 
impact on the development of city police departments during the 
first twenty years of the twentieth century. Police departments 
provided a vital service to the city, and yet they invariably had 
a past that was colored by corruption and subservience to the 
interests of party bosses. Thus, they were natural targets for the 
work of these reformers. Like the civic reformers who worked to 
improve other components of municipal government, those who 
focused on the police tended to have ties with the elite, 
professional or business classes. Chief among these were Leonhard 
Fuld, a professor of actalnlstrative law at Columbia University,
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and Raymond B. Fosdlck, whose comprehensive study, American Police 
Systems, was published by the Bureau of Social Hygiene, an 
organization that was funded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Scholars 
writing in the 1970's and 1980's have asserted that these reform 
Impulses had their origins In the competition between classes 
within the urban community. Samuel Walker argues that the 
reformers sought to break the power that the working class held 
over the police. Thomas Reppetto asserts, "until well into the 
twentieth century, it can be argued that the call for 
ackninlstratlve reform was simply an attempt by an upper-class 
minority to secure control over police acknlnistration regardless 
of the will of the electorate." Sidney Harring claims that the 
reformers' goal was to re-establish upper-class control over the 
police so they would remain "an effective anti-working-class 
force," while Eric Monkkonen Insists that one of the goals of 
police reform was to eliminate the working-class attitudes and 
values of the rank-and-file patrolman.2
In contrast to the reformers of the late 1800's, the early 
twentieth-century police reformers did not feel that shifting 
control of the city police department from one level of government 
to another was, by itself, enough to significantly improve the 
performance of urban police forces. Instead, they focused far more 
attention on the conditions that existed within the police 
department itself. The aim of the police reformer of this period 
was to create a highly disciplined crime-fighting organization 
that would be independent of outside control and, hence, would
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enforce laws with consistency and Impartiality. The behavior of 
the members of such a department would not be controlled by the 
promise of patronage and of petty graft, but by obedience within a 
hierarchical command structure and by a strict adherence to a code 
of professional standards. The scope of the police department's 
duties, these reformers believed, also had to be narrowed to 
include nothing more than the prevention of crime and the strict 
enforcement of the law if the department were to perform these two 
functions with an acceptable degree of efficiency.3
Reformers like Fuld and Fosdlck identified three 
characteristics which they believed were essential to the proper 
operation of a city police department: independence from outside 
interference, centralized decision-making and professionalism. In 
most cases they found American police forces to be sorely lacking 
in each of these areas. They repeatedly pointed to police 
departments in Europe, especially to that of London, as examples 
of highly efficient, we 11-organized agencies that were well beyond 
the reach of local or even national politicians. However, by 1915, 
American police reformers were beginning to see some of the same 
characteristics in the Boston Police Department. As a result, the 
Boston police earned a fair amount of praise from police 
reformers. According to Fosdlck, the Boston Police Department 
"stood well in the lead of police organizations throughout the 
country." Another observer, George H. McCaffrey, claimed that 
"Boston had a very excellent police force, perhaps the best in 
America."4
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Departmental Independence
To the police reformers of the early twentieth century, the 
effective performance of police duties was only possible in a 
department that was independent of all outside influence, and the 
greatest threat to this independence, in their minds, came from 
local politicians. As Fuld explained it, "When the politician's 
influence begins to be felt In a police department the efficiency 
of the department is bound to suffer." To Fuld there was an 
inherent conflict between the politicians interest in securing 
popularity by promoting a maximum of personal freedom and the 
police departments proper function, which was, in Fuld's opinion, 
to limit individual freedom by enforcing the law. According to 
Fuld, in a police department over which local politicians hold 
sway, the most efficient policemen will be punished while the most 
lax will be rewarded. Fosdlck insisted that a force that is not 
completely Independent of political control is a "force 
acininlstered with an eye to the next election,...its work dictated 
by the political necessities of the moment."5
In their opposition to the political machine's dominance of 
police departments, these reformers had something in common with 
their predecessors of the nineteenth century. Fuld echoed the 
sentiments of many earlier reformers when he wrote, "American 
cities have shown an utter incapacity for self-government in the 
department of police acininistration." However, the 
twentieth-century police reformers had seen enough of state 
control to know that it did not guarantee the police department's
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Independence from partisan politics. Fosdlck found state 
Interference In police affairs as unforgivable as local 
interference. He lamented the fact that, even while under state 
control, city police departments had been made "pawns In the clash 
of party interests." According to Fosdlck, "The effect of this 
treatment on police organization has been peculiarly disastrous."6 
In Boston/s case, however, Fosdlck found a rare example of 
state control which he felt had been very successful. He praised 
the fact that, in Boston, "the actainistration of the police force 
was conducted with a disregard for political considerations rarely 
encountered in American cities" and insisted that the departments 
progress would not have been possible had the department remained 
under local control. "Whether due to a large foreign population, 
or some condition of civic inertia, or factors peculiarly local," 
he wrote, "the government elected by the city of Boston has 
generally been below the level of government elected by the state 
of Massachusetts."7 George McCaffrey insisted that, before 1885:
the interests of the whole commonwealth were being 
injured by the mismanagement of police affairs in 
Boston. Political Influence then ran the 
department in all its branches; officers were 
appointed, removed and transferred without any 
reference to their own personal qualifications.
Vice flourished in many forms all over the city.
However, due to the assumption of control by the state, McCaffrey 
noted, "political /pull/ is of absolutely no account in the police 
organization of to-day; there is not a single gambling house of
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any account in Boston and the laws relating to the sale of liquor 
can no longer be violated with impunity.-8
Reformers attributed much of this success to the policies 
adopted by Stephen O'Meara, who served as Boston's police 
commissioner from 1906, when the three-man police board was 
replaced by a single commissioner, until his death twelve years 
later. O'Meara was an anomaly in the Boston political arena: he 
was an Irish Republican. He had been born in Prince Edward Island, 
Canada, and had moved to Boston with his family in 1864, when he 
was ten years old. O'Meara grew up in predominantly-Irish 
Charlestown, and then went to work as a reporter for the Boston 
£Lob£* From there he moved to the Boston Journal. where he 
eventually advanced from reporter to editor to general manager and 
finally to part-owner. In 1904, O'Meara launched a campaign to win 
a Republican nomination for Congress, but was unsuccessful. 
Nevertheless, his Republican politics and his financial success 
brought O'Meara a degree of contact with Boston's social elite 
that was unheard of for an Irish Catholic of his day. He was a 
member of the Exchange, Algonquin, St. Botolph's and Union clubs 
and was a personal friend of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.9
O'Meara represented the new breed of police administrator that 
emerged during the early twentieth century. Most of his experience 
had been in private business, not in public administration. In 
fact, before he assumed command of the Boston Police Department, 
O'Meara had had no experience with police work whatsoever. Like 
August Vollmer of Berkeley, California, Richard Sylvester of
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Washington, D.C. and numerous other police executives, O'Meara 
shared the reformers' belief in departmental independence, 
centralized control and professionalism. In fact, it was the 
appointment of O'Meara and actalnistrators like him that allowed 
the ideas of the reformers to be put into practice in city police
departments.10
One of O'Meara's foremost priorities as commissioner was to 
eliminate all traces of political Influence from the Boston Police 
Department. After just a year in office, O'Meara reported:
The first efforts of the Police Commissioner were 
directed to the task of convincing the members of 
the admirable police force over which he took 
control that they were to be absolutely free from 
outside interference....They...were to look only 
to their department superiors for rewards and 
punishments.
Five years later, O'Meara proudly announced in his annual report 
to the city government that "The Boston Police Department is 
wholly free from politics —  the root of all evil in the policing 
of American cities and towns." He went on to proclaim that, during 
his tenure as police convnlssloner, not a single appointment, 
promotion, transfer, expenditure or licensing decision "had been 
influenced by any political personage or political 
consideration.*12
O'Meara's ever-vigllant defense against outside interference 
at times drew him into conflict with other city officials. In 
1910, Mayor John F. Fitzgerald attempted to bypass both the civil 
service commission and the police department's regular procedures
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for hiring and detailing patrolmen by personally assigning four 
special policemen to the department for the purpose of patrolling 
Boston Common and Franklin Square. In a series of letters to the 
mayor, O'Meara protested this action, which he believed "would be 
the beginning of an untested, unorganized, uninstructed, 
undisciplined police force, control led...by the city authorities." 
He underscored the fact that "the Boston police are assigned to 
all parts of the city in accordance with the judgment and 
experience of the heads of the department," and made it clear that 
no one would be allowed to interfere with this prerogative. 
Fitzgerald angrily replied:
I trust that mere loyalty to your own department 
and an excessive regard for the technicalities of 
the case will not override your sense of the 
larger interests which are involved. It seems to 
me your duty either to ratify these appointments 
or to meet the situation by increasing the number 
of officers on the Common and Franklin S q u a r e .*3
Nevertheless, O'Meara refused to comply with the Mayor's request, 
and the matter was dropped.
Even O'Meara's friend Henry Cabot Lodge could not persuade 
the commissioner to overlook department rules. Lodge made a 
personal petition to O'Meara requesting that the department hire a 
candidate, Francis McDonald, who did not meet the physical 
requirements for appointment as a patrolman. Lodge wrote to 
O'Meara, "I take real interest in this case and should be much 
indebted for anything you can do," to which O'Meara replied, "The 
trouble with Mr. Francis McDonald...is that he walks very badly
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and for a policeman that Is a fatal defect....We are obliged to be 
more particular."14
Unlike their predecessors in the nineteenth century, the 
police reformers of the early twentieth century did not Invoke the 
principle of departmental Independence merely when trying to wrest 
the police department from the control of the party boss. While 
they recognized that machine politicians posed the most immediate 
threat to the independence of the police department, these 
reformers insisted that the operation of the department remain 
free from any outside Influence, no matter what the source 
(except, of course, influence from well-intentioned and insightful 
reformers like themselves!). For example, they disagreed with 
their predecessors on the inherent value of the civil service laws 
that governed personnel matters. Fosdlck Insisted that, as a 
result of civil service regulations, "there are in most large 
departments many men whose continuance in office is a menace to 
the force and to the community but who cannot be dismissed because 
the proof of incompetence or dishonesty does not satisfy the 
requirements of the civil service law." If a businessman were to 
try to run his enterprise in such a manner, he insisted, "He would 
be foredoomed to failure from the start." Fosdlck believed that 
police administrators should have a freer hand in removing 
undesirable officers. He also claimed that allowing tests 
administered by a civil service board to determine which officers 
should receive promotions "ranks symmetry above real efficiency." 
Fuld insisted that the exams were not effective indicators of the
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officers7 potential for success for, as he put it, "the best 
scholar is not necessarily the best policeman." Both men agreed 
that a supervisor's assessment of the candidate's work provided 
the best measure of a candidate's readiness for promotion.15
The process for distributing promotions within the Boston 
Police Department was based, in part, on non-competitive exams, 
but it also gave great discretionary power to police 
administrators. According to this system, division captains 
nominated patrolmen for promotion. Only those candidates who were 
nominated and who received the approval of the police commissioner 
were given civil service exams. The police commissioner would then 
receive a list of those candidates who had passed the exam and 
would award promotions to those men on the list whom he deemed to 
be most worthy, regardless of their rank on the list. In 1913, the 
state's civil service commission proposed the introduction of 
competitive exams that would have been open to all who desired 
promotions in order to make the police department conform to the 
practices that were standard for other public agencies in the 
state. O'Meara succeeded in blocking this change, which he called 
"by far the greatest danger that has threatened this department 
from any source in my seven years of service as commissioner." 
Fosdlck praised the system of non-competitive examination used by 
the Boston Police Department, likening it to the one used by the 
London Police Department, and proclaimed it the best solution to 
the problem of identifying officers for promotion.15
2?
Police reformers even argued that intervention by the courts 
should be restricted, especially in cases that involved personnel 
decisions. They stood staunchly opposed to granting policemen the 
right to appeal their superiors' decisions in court. Fuld asserted 
that, "The reinstatement of dismissed members of the force, which 
amounts practically to a reversal of the careful and deliberate 
decision of the chief administrative officer of the police force 
by the courts, tends to lessen the respect in which the members of 
the force should hold their c h i e f . F o s d l c k  agreed, insisting 
that "the unrestricted right of appeal to the courts from the 
decision of a police administrator is a menace to the proper 
exercise of discipline." Again, Fosdlck pointed out that such 
conditions would not be tolerated in a business, and he praised 
the Boston Police Department, whose men were forbidden to appeal 
administrative decisions in the courts:
On no other basis can responsibility be 
definitized and a police force be rid of useless 
or dishonest employees. To divide responsibility 
with a civil service commissioner, a mayor, a 
court, or any other authority, is to sow the seed 
of demoralization and to make real success 
Impossible for any adnlnlstrator.1®
Thus, the Boston Police Department came closer to replicating 
the early twentieth-century police reformers' model of a police 
force that was independent of outside influences than did the 
departments in most other major cities in the United States. To a 
large degree, police officials were able to exercise this 
Independence because of the retention of state control and its
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denial of influence to local politicians who had a significant 
interest in using the department to promote their own personal 
political goals. It was Police Commissioner O'Meara's unwavering 
commitment to and stubborn defense of the principle of 
departmental independence, however, that significantly limited the 
degree to which all outside groups, not simply local political 
leaders, were able to Influence police department policies and 
practices.
Centralized Desiaion-maKliig
To the early twentieth-century police reformer, the absence 
of outside interference in police affairs did not by Itself 
guarantee proper adninistration of the department. This 
independence had to be accompanied by a complete centralization of 
the decision-making power within the department. Like their 
contemporaries who sought to alter the administrative structure of 
municipal government as a whole, these reformers placed great 
stock in the effectiveness of executive offices. Thus, they 
devoted great attention to the role of the chief acknlnlstrator of 
the department: the police commissioner in a large city or the 
police chief in a small city or town. So long as he was chosen 
solely on the basis of his ability as an administrator, police 
reformers felt that the chief executive should be given virtually 
unlimited power within the department and that he should be 
allowed to continue in office as long as he performed his duties 
effectively.^
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To the reformers, the issue of departmental autonomy was 
Inextricably connected with the idea of centralized 
decision-making. Reformers and police acknlnistrators alike viewed 
outside intervention in such matters as the appointment or 
assignment of officers, the issuing of promotions or the 
punishment of members of the force to be an Intolerable 
encroachment on the police executive's proper Jurisdiction. Such 
encroachment, they felt, divided the responsibility for 
decision-making and severely undermined the departments ability 
to perform its duties effectively. At the same time, 
centralization of authority within the department was seen as the 
best defense against external pressures. Fuld insisted that the 
centralization of power in the hands of a single commissioner 
would distance the police department from local politics, while 
McCaffrey credited centralized control within the Boston Police 
Department with "absolutely eliminatCing] the Influence of 
politics in a p p o i n t m e n t s . " 20 Agajn> recent historians have 
interpreted the reformers' faith in centralized authority as a 
product of the competition for control of the police by various 
classes and Interest groups. Robert Fogelson argues that the move 
to Increase the power of police executives was designed to 
“strengthen their position vis-a-vis the ward bosses" and to break 
the bosses' hold over the rank-and-file policemen. Sidney Harring 
claims that the establishment of a strong police executive who 
would function beyond the reach of elected officials was an 
upper-class adjustment to the growing political power of an
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organized working class. Samuel Walker agrees that centralization 
was primarily an effort to Isolate the police department from the 
working cl ass.21
To Fuld, Fosdlck and other reformers, dividing the 
responsibility for a police department by placing It under the 
Jurisdiction of a board of supervisors was a grave error. Unlike 
the reformers of the previous century who viewed divided authority 
as a safeguard against corruption and favoritism, Fosdlck found it 
"an encumbrance rather than a help. The essential qualities in 
police actainistration are those which a single-headed executive 
can best bring to task." Upon reviewing the performance of police 
boards In various cities, Fosdlck concluded that the lack of unity 
and the indecisiveness which marked such boards prevented their 
police departments from taking any "progressive steps." Fuld 
contended that:
The single commissioner system...is well fitted 
for the discharge of duties which require energy 
and rapidity of action and for which it is 
desirable to have a fixed and well-defined 
responsibility. No department of the city 
government requires more rapid, or more energetic, 
or more responsible action than does the police."
Fuld pointed out that in Europe, police departments were generally 
commanded by single acbninistrators, "as [they] logically should 
be.'22
Reformers were encouraged by the fact that the days of the 
city police board seemed to be numbered. During the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, city after city dismantled the
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police boards that had been set up during the previous wave of 
reform. New York led the way when It abolished Its police board in 
1901 and transferred control to a single police commissioner. In 
contrast to the belatedness with which It had instituted earlier 
structural reforms, Boston was one of the first cities to 
implement this form of control. In 1906, the Massachusetts 
legislature abolished the three-man board of commissioners which 
it had created twenty-one years before and replaced it with a 
single commissioner. Like the earlier board, the commissioner was 
to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the state's 
Executive Council. In order to minimize possible political 
pressure on the commissioner, he was to be appointed for a 
five-year term by a governor who had to run for re-election 
annually. A governor could not remove the police commissioner from 
office without the consent of the Executive Council. In approving 
this restructuring, Governor Curtis Guild reiterated the 
reformers' position on centralized control, saying “inefficiency, 
if not disaster, follows divided responsibility in the control of 
any organized body of men, where discipline and esprit de corps 
must be the mainspring of success."23 In addition to New York and 
Boston, other cities including Cleveland (1908), Cincinnati 
(1908), Birmingham (1911), Omaha (1912), Saint Paul (1914) and 
Buffalo (1916) adopted single-headed police administrations. By 
1920, only 14 of the 52 American cities with populations of over 
100,000 still retained police boards. However, among these 
fourteen were Baltimore, Kansas City and Saint Louis, the only
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large cities other than Boston whose police departments remained 
under state supervision. Boston, thus, became the only large city 
in the United States with a police force that was administered by 
a single powerful commissioner whose selection was completely 
beyond the control of city officials.24
Under chapter 291 of the Acts of 1906 of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, the legislation that created the single-headed 
ackninistration, Boston/s police commissioner was granted extensive 
powers over both policy and personnel matters. As the head of the 
department hierarchy, he maintained control over the force through 
the division captains, who were responsible to him alone. He was 
free to issue general orders and to amend the department rules at 
any time, and such decisions were not subject to review by any 
other body or official. When positions on the force became vacant, 
the civil service commission sent the police commissioner a list 
of the top scorers from the most recent round of civil service 
exams. The number of candidates on the list was always 
approximately double the number of open positions. After he had 
personally interviewed each applicant on the list, the police 
commissioner chose the men whom he wished to hire. As was true 
regarding the promotion of officers, the commissioner was free to 
choose any candidate regardless of his rank on the list of exam 
scores. When a disciplinary complaint was lodged against an 
officer, a trial board consisting of three division captains was 
appointed by the police commissioner to hear the case, determine 
the guilt or innocence of the officer in question, and recommend a
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punishment. The police commissioner, however, was free to order a 
new hearing to be held before either the original board of 
inquiry, a new board of his choosing, or himself. He was also free 
to accept, reject or modify the boards sentencing recommendation 
as he saw fit. The commissioner's decisions in such cases were 
final and could not be appealed to the courts. Furthermore, the 
commissioner had the power to simply dismiss a complaint against 
an officer without a trial if he felt that the complaint was too 
trivial to warrant action. The commissioner even had control over 
the salaries of the departments members, for they could not be 
changed without his approval.^5
By 1910, then, the administrative structure of the Boston 
Police Department showed a degree of conformity to the principles 
of autonomy and centralization that was unrivaled by any other 
department in the nation. State control had severely curtailed the 
influence that local politicians were able to exercise over the 
department leadership. The elimination of board control and its 
replacement by a single commissioner had placed responsibility for 
all adninlstratlve decisions in the hands of a single executive 
officer who was not accountable to the city government, to the 
local party hierarchy or to the voters of the city. In fact, due 
to the provisions that protected his tenure in office, the police 
commissioner was only loosely accountable to the state officials 
to whom he owed his position. According to the reformers, such 
conditions served to maximize the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process within the department by allowing the sole
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objective of the commissioner's policies to be the Improvement of 
the force/s ability to fight crime. Not only did the Boston Police 
Departments acknlnlstratlve structure conform to the model 
proposed by the reformers, but the man who Initially occupied the 
top position within this structure shared most of the reformers/ 
views and endeavored to put their principles into practice.
0/Meara was a strong, intelligent and capable leader who had 
committed himself to the constant improvement of his departments 
performance. As a result of these conditions, reformers repeatedly 
praised the administration of the Boston Police Department. 
However, while they placed great emphasis on structural reforms, 
the reformers did not fail to recognize that a flawless 
acknlnlstratlve system did not necessarily guarantee optimal 
efficiency In the performance of duties. Improving police 
performance ultimately required altering the behavior and the 
attitudes of the rank-and-file policeman. This was the aim of the 
third principle promoted by the police reformers: professionalism. 
Altering the outlook of the patrolman on his beat, however, proved 
to be a far greater challenge than modifying the departments 
command structure.
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CHAPTER III
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND THE POLICEMAN
While departmental independence and the centralization of 
authority altered the administrative structure of the police 
force, professionalization, the third component of the reformers' 
program, was designed to alter the attitudes and behavior of the 
policeman himself, as well as his relationship to his department. 
Realizing that the ultimate responsibility for carrying out 
performance objectives rested with the patrolman on his beat, 
reformers turned their attention to identifying modifications 
which, they hoped, would bring the conduct of patrolmen more in 
line with the aims of the police reform movement. This generated 
as much conflict as (if not more than) any other aspect of early 
twentieth-century police reform. In part, this conflict resulted 
from internal contradictions within the professional ideal itself. 
Professionalization, in the end, led to the pursuit of goals that 
were inherently incompatible with one another. In addition, 
though, professionalization brought the policeman into conflict 
with the reform movement. The reformers, socially Isolated from 
the patrolman, had little understanding of, and even less sympathy 
for, his needs. As a result, the implementation of specific reform 
proposals was often detrimental to the patrolman's interests and 
frequently demanded that the patrolman distance himself from his 
own social and cultural background. In fact, Eric Monkkonen 
contends that one of the chief aims of the professionalization
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movement was to eliminate the working-class nature of the 
patrolman's values and attitudes.1 In the end, professionalization 
had two distinct effects: it generated an increased occupational 
identity among the policemen and it contributed to the growing 
frustration that they felt on the Job. These two attitudes were 
destined to collide with one another.
The rank-and-file of the typical city police department of 
the early twentieth century was recruited overwhelmingly from the 
working class of the city it served. As Leonhard Fuld pointed out, 
“Men who have enjoyed the benefit of a good general education are 
deterred from entering the police service in America, both because 
of the inadequate salaries as well as because of the generally 
undesirable character of police work." While low prestige and 
salaries comparable to those paid to skilled laborers deterred men 
from the middle and upper classes from pursuing a career with the 
police department, the relative security of the Jobs in the 
department, which were less directly affected by fluctuations in 
the economy than was true of most industrial Jobs, made police 
work very attractive to members of the working class. Thus, Fuld 
was able to report, patrolmen were "generally found among the 
poorer people— drivers, motormen, porters, laborers, and the 
like."2 This characterization was true of the Boston Police 
Department. In his annual report for 1914, Police Commissioner 
O'Meara divided the previous occupations of all of the members of 
the Boston Police Force, more than fifteen hundred men, into the 
following categories:
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Mechanical trades and other skilled handiwork 
Transportation
Mercantile and manufacturing pursuits 
Public and semi-public service 
Unski 1 led occupations 
Miseellaneous
523 (33.0%) 
516 (32.5%) 
263 (16.6%) 
116 (7.3%)
86 (5.4%) 
82 (5.2%)
1586
O'Meara also identified the specific occupations that the men had 
held before Joining the police department. Thirty-one men had been 
in business for themselves; thirty had been managers, foremen or 
superintendents; five had farmed; two had been athletic 
instructors; one had been a photographer; one a ball player; and 
one a student. All of the remaining men (95.5%) had held jobs that 
could be classified as either skilled, clerical, service or 
unskilled occupations. The specific occupations held by the 
largest number of men were:
Street railway motormen 161 men
Teamsters 140
Clerks 118
Street railway conductors 91
Drivers, coachmen, chauffeurs, etc. 54
Machinists 50
Metalworkers 50
Firefighters 50
Locomotive and stationary engineers and firemen 47
Carpenters and woodworkers 42
Only 19 of the men (1.2%) had been policemen with another 
department at the time of their appointment to the Boston Police
The composition of the police force also reflected the impact 
that immigration had had on Boston/s population. In a city in 
which approximately 36% of the population was foreign-born, thirty
Force.3
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per cent of the men on the police force In 1914 had been born 
abroad. Over half of these had been born in Ireland. Furthermore, 
by 1920 about half of all of Boston's policemen and 41% of its 
residents were second-generation Americans. As the figures below 
show, however, recently-arrived immigrant groups, such as the 
Italians and the Russians, whose social status tended to fall 
below that of the immigrant groups that had arrived earlier, were 
significantly under-represented on the police force:
Place of Birth Boston Police Force Boston Population
<1914) (1910)
Total 1,586 670,585
United States 1,108 (69.9%) 427,220 <63.7%)
Ireland 264 <16.7%) 66,041 <9.8%)
Canada & Newfoundland 155 <9.8%) 51,363 <7.7%)
Great Britain 28 <1.8%) 19,048 <2.8%)
Scandinavia 14 <0.9%) 10,523 <1.6%)
Germany 10 <0.6%) 8,701 <1.3%)
Italy 3 <0.2%) 31,380 <4.7%)
Russia 1 <0.1%) 41,892 <6.2%)
Other 3 <0.2%) 14,417 <2.1%)
Of those born within the United States, 694 (43.8% of the entire 
force) had been born within the city of B o s t o n . 4
The overwhelming majority of the Boston Police Force, 
therefore, was recruited directly from the upper and middle ranks 
of the city's own working class, with first- and second-generation 
Irish-Americans comprising the largest share of the f o r c e .® As a 
result, the members of the department had strong ties to the 
community which they served and, in particular, to the city's 
working-class neighborhoods. This was typical of most large cities
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In the United States. As Fuld observed, "the poor classes 
fraternize with the policemen, since the policemen are of their 
own social class", while the middle and upper classes tended to 
remain aloof.^
To the reformer of the early twentieth century, the 
predominantly working-class character of the rank-and-file 
patrolman was most regrettable. Fuld complained, "The patrolmen 
are almost Invariably men of limited education and Intelligence." 
In fact, the reformers displayed nothing but contempt for the very 
men whom they expected to play a central role in the new, more 
efficient city police departments they were trying to create. 
Raymond Fosdlck described the patrolman as "often...without 
imagination or resourcefulness." Fuld was even sharper in his 
condemnation. "The low opinion in which the American policemen are 
held is due more to their intellectual inferiority than to 
anything else," he wrote. The Job attracts, "the man who desires a 
position requiring only a minimum of work....[It] does not attract 
into the ranks of the police men who would in private life attain 
distinction by their efforts." Not only did the average new 
recruit fail to meet with Fuld's approval, but, at least according 
to Professor Fuld, the patrolman/s laziness actually increased 
after he Joined the force. "The authority with which they are 
invested," Fuld said, "and the respect shown them by the citizens, 
create in them an Inordinate desire to shirk their work or, as 
they themselves express it, 'to take it easy.'" These deficiencies 
worried Fuld considerably. Pointing out that the policeman out on
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patrol somewhere In the city could not be directly supervised by 
his superiors at all times, Fuld argued that the job required a 
far greater degree of reliability and sound Judgment than he felt 
the average patrolman possessed.7
The primary objective of professionalization, then, was to 
"upgrade" the patrolman. The reformers7 plan was to transform what 
they saw as a simple-minded, working-class Idler, devoid of the 
slightest appreciation for the significance of his position, into 
a dedicated, well-disciplined crime-fighting expert. They demanded 
that stricter physical, mental and moral standards be employed 
when hiring new recruits, and Fuld and others called on officials 
to increase salaries and to improve working conditions in order to 
induce the better-educated to choose policing as a career. In 
addition to improving the pool of candidates from which policemen 
were chosen, the reformers recommended measures to improve the 
performance of those men already on the force. For instance, they 
aggressively promoted the establishment and improvement of 
training programs. At the same time, they demanded that the 
patrolman's work be subjected to closer supervision and that he be 
held more regularly accountable for the proper observation of 
departmental procedures. Fuld called on the police supervisor to 
constantly monitor his men and to avoid fraternization and "all 
unofficerlike familiarity with his subordinates." Police reformers 
also enthusiastically advocated the employment of the latest 
crime-fighting methods and technology.8
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Aside from Improving the general level of skill possessed by 
the average patrolman, the reformers also sought to change the 
policeman's own perception of his work. Associating a higfc rate of 
turnover in personnel with the days of partisan interference, the 
reformers set out to stabilize the police department by 
introducing the idea that police work was not Just a Job to be 
held until a better one came along. Patrolmen, according to Fuld, 
had to be convinced to “make the police business their lifework.-9 
In short, the reformers hoped to instill a middle-class concept of 
career in a population that was overwhelmingly working-class in 
background.
The police reformers showed little regard for whether or not 
such fundamental changes met with the approval of the patrolmen 
themselves. To the reformers, and to many police administrators, 
the patrolman's opinion was of little value and was certainly not 
to enter into any discussion regarding the improvement of police 
performance. Samuel Walker writes, “the patrolman was regarded as 
clay, to be molded by the police executive.1 According to Fuld, 
“they are soldiers, whose first duty is to obey.-1** Such military 
analogies were commonly invoked by police reformers and public 
officials alike during the early part of the twentieth century. 
Major Richard Sylvester, the head of the Washington, D.C. police 
department, referred to his men as “citizen soldiers." In 1918, 
the mayor of Cincinnati compared the role of the police of his 
city with that of the American troops fighting in France, and, in 
an effort to ensure the policemen's adherence to department
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policy, stated, "Policemen are soldiers and they should obey 
orders as they have sworn to do." In fact, it was during this 
period that it became common for the various ranks within the 
police department to be given military labels: patrolmen became 
privates, and superior officers became sergeants, lieutenants and 
captains.*1
Reformers and public officials of this period also began to 
voice the opinion that holding a public service position was a 
privilege and that, due to his peculiar position within the 
community, the policeman could not expect to be allowed to 
exercise the same rights as other citizens. In 1897, in the case 
of McAuliffe v. Mavor of New Bedford. Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes of the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a policeman 
could be dismissed from his position for engaging in political 
activity when such activity was forbidden by a police department 
regulation. Holmes argued, "The petitioner may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman....The servant cannot 
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are 
offered to him." These same principles were Invoked when the 
"Goethals Bill" was introduced in the New York State Legislature 
in 1914. This bill would have taken away the New York policemen's 
right to appeal departmental disciplinary decisions in the courts. 
By pressuring legislators, policemen were able to prevent the 
passage of the bill. However, a similar measure had already 
deprived the Boston police of the right of appeal in such cases.*2
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Professionalization of the police force required alteration 
of more than Just the policeman's behavior and perceptions, 
however. The range of duties that policemen performed had to be 
drastically narrowed, the reformers believed, if the police were 
to efficiently perform the crime-fighting functions for which they 
had been trained. Traditionally, city police forces had provided a 
tremendous array of services: from providing food and shelter for 
the indigent to compiling the annual census of school children, 
from investigating Jurors to inspecting tenements. They supervised 
elections, cleaned the streets, registered voters, caught stray 
animals and issued licenses to saloon keepers, carriage operators, 
dog breeders, peddlers and musicians. To reformers, these services 
were unnecessary distractions. Fosdlck called them "Irrelevant 
activities” and complained that, because of them, ”the primary 
function of the police has often been left to drift along with 
little guidance or oversight by administrators." "To this unwise 
and unsound partnership between the police force and unrelated 
functions of government," he argued, "much of the corruption and 
demoralization in American municipalities can be traced." Not only 
did the reformers demand the elimination of all of the 
non-crime-related services that the department as a whole 
provided, but they also called for strict limits on the types of 
tasks that individual patrolmen were required to perform. Fuld 
insisted that patrolmen should not be assigned to perform clerical
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work, to assist in other municipal departments, or to run errands 
for superior officers. Such tasks, if they were necessary, were to 
be assigned to clerks, for patrolmen "are too expensive for this 
work. They are selected for police patrol service and it is wrong 
to detail them for any [other] purpose.-13
In Boston, Police Commissioner O'Meara did his best to 
promote the professional ideal among his men. His goal, like that 
of the police reformers, was to mold the department into a 
dedicated, disciplined and efficient crime-fighting force. Shortly 
after his death, the Boston Globe paid tribute to O'Meara by 
pointing out that -Mr. O'Meara had impressed it on his men that 
their's were not 'Jobs' but 'positions,' and that they had been 
chosen for their work because of special fitness of which they had 
a right to be proud and to which they must live up.-14 From the 
outset, O'Meara made the maintenance of honesty and integrity a 
top priority in his department. In his first annual report as 
commissioner, he announced that he had found no trace of 
corruption within the department, but that -the watch will 
continue, and the punishment of the guilty, if any, will be as 
severe as the laws of the State, as well as the rules of the 
department, will sanction." Five years later, O'Meara proudly 
reported that since he had assumed command of the department, only 
one officer had been convicted of accepting a bribe: the policeman 
in question had been given two dollars in return for ignoring a 
traffic violation. By the time of O'Meara's death in 1918,
Boston's police department had been recognized throughout the
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nation as a rare example of a city police force that maintained a 
high standard of integrity and self-respect. O'Meara himself had 
also earned a reputation for dealing fairly with his men.15
O'Meara likewise stressed the importance of remaining within 
the law even while performing normal police duties. In the face of 
tremendous pressure from reformers who demanded that the police 
take more aggressive action to combat vices like gambling, 
drinking and prostitution, O'Meara insisted that his men adhere 
strictly to proper procedure. In his 1910 report, he wrote:
The steady purpose of this department is that the 
policemen, above all persons, shall respect the 
law; and if the time ever comes when...the police 
assume authority which the law does not give to 
them, and thus themselves become lawbreakers, the 
people of Boston will be the sufferers....Boston 
newspapers, and doubtless many citizens, criticize 
at this time the Police Commissioner of Boston as 
narrow and technical because he has Insisted 
steadily, and still insists, that the police for 
whom he is responsible shall follow the law at all 
times, not their own impulses.
O'Meara taught his men to take both verbal and physical abuse from 
irate citizens without responding in kind. He also made a point of 
proclaiming that the use of physical or mental torture to extract 
confessions from suspects, the so-called "third degree", which was 
a fairly common practice in some departments, had "no place in the 
Boston Police Department," and would not be tolerated.15
O'Meara's policies regarding rewards for his officers also 
conformed to the teachings of the police reformers. The year 
before O'Meara took office, a total of thirty medals had been 
awarded to Boston policemen "for hazardous or dangerous service
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while in the performance of duty,* In addition to medals, the men 
often received extra vacation time in recognition of particularly 
brave or praiseworthy acts. O'Meara abolished these practices. *1 
seek to convince the policeman that the best and bravest work that 
he can do is expected of him always,* O'Meara explained. As a 
result, he claimed, meritorious acts *have become every-day 
matters." Expressing a similar sentiment, Fuld wrote, "When a 
policeman saves a life at a burning building or stops a runaway 
horse, he is merely performing routine police duty, for which he 
is paid."^
O'Meara also modified the system of discipline employed by 
the department. During 1905, the year before O'Meara took office, 
105 cases were heard by department trial boards. In 58 of these, 
the officer in question was found not guilty. Of the remaining 47, 
26 were fined, five were demoted, seven were discharged, seven 
received reprimands and two resigned. Acting on the belief that 
frequent acquittals and minor punishments led the men to look 
lightly upon the department's system of discipline, O'Meara worked 
to minimize the frequency of such outcomes. He took liberal 
advantage of the power, granted to the police commissioner in the 
Reorganization Act of 1906, to dismiss complaints against a 
policeman if, in the commissioner's opinion, the charges were 
found to be * frivolous or otherwise without merit sufficient to 
Justify formal hearing.* However, he also stiffened the penalties 
for those officers who were found guilty of negligence or 
wrongdoing. By 1908, O'Meara had reduced the number of trials to
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36, but of these, only nine ended in acquittal. Of the remaining 
27, 14 resulted in dismissals and one in the resignation of the 
officer in question. Thus, in 56% of the cases that did not result 
in acquittal, the officer's career with the force ended, as 
opposed to 19% in 1905. Viewing fines, the most commonly employed 
means of punishment during the period before his appointment, as 
excessively injurious to the officer's family, O'Meara eliminated 
this form of punishment and replaced it with extra, unpaid duty 
assignments, at times assigning up to 210 hours of punishment duty 
for a single offense. In 1908, seven officers received this form 
of punishment. During the course of that year, however, O'Meara 
dismissed charges in 49 cases in which he felt a trial was not 
warranted. During O'Meara's adninistration, department trial 
boards heard an average of 25 cases per year, down from 85 per 
year during the seven years before he took office. On the average, 
O'Meara dismissed 29 complaints, or over half of the complaints 
lodged against officers, without a trial each year. However, the 
acquittal rate fell from over 50% to 30%. O'Meara hoped that this 
policy would "cause a complaint and summons for trial to be 
regarded by members of the force as a matter of great gravity, and 
to deter them from the commission of petty offenses, the penalty 
of which they can no longer expect to be also petty." O'Meara's 
discipline policy appeared to have had the effect that he 
intended: the number of officers who were punished for 
disciplinary infractions fell from an average of 42 per year (1899 
to 1905) to 17 per year <1907 to 1918).
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Finally, like the advocates of police reform, O'Meara lobbied 
for the elimination of police duties that were unrelated to crime 
fighting. In this struggle, however, he did not always receive the 
cooperation of the state legislature. While, in 1906, the 
legislature released the police department from the responsibility 
for Issuing liquor licenses, the next year it gave the department 
Jurisdiction over the distribution of licenses for street vendors. 
By 1912, the department was responsible for issuing 25,000 
licenses a year to, among others, dog-owners, itinerant musicians, 
carriage operators, and keepers of lodging houses. In 1907, the 
legislature ruled that the department was to take on the task of 
investigating the character and fitness of prospective Jurors, a 
duty which required the police to make inquiries about and visit 
the homes of 7000 of the city's residents in the first year alone. 
O'Meara complained that "the police are proud of this increasing 
trust which is reposed in them by the Legislature, but no one 
outside the force itself seems to have thought that there is a 
limit to the kind and the quantity of work which they can do." In 
1916, the state relinquished the department from the 
responsibility of compiling the list of the city's quarter of a 
mi 11 ion voters, a task that occupied nearly the entire force for 
several days each year. A year later, however, the state 
legislature transferred responsibility for the listing back to the 
police department over O'Meara's strenuous objections.1*
Compared to the structural reforms that were advocated by the 
police reformers of the early twentieth century, the principles of
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professionalism were applied with far less consistency in the 
nation's urban police departments* For example, while many police 
departments raised the standards for new recruits and implemented 
more extensive training programs, most cities were very reluctant 
to accede to the reformers/ demands for increased salaries. With 
over one thousand patrolmen on a police force, even a small salary 
increase added a tremendous sum to the expenses of a large city 
like Boston, and a raise for policemen usually sparked demands for 
similar Increases from firemen and other municipal employees. So 
police departments did not manage to raise salaries to a level 
that was substantial enough to attract large numbers of 
middle-class recruits. In most departments, however, discipline 
and accountability received far greater emphasis than they had 
earlier. Likewise, the number of services unrelated to crime 
fighting for which the police were responsible generally declined 
during the late 1800's and early 1900/s, although, as in the case 
of Boston, the police department was still used to some degree as 
a catch-all by public officials. Each police department's 
administrator, of course, either chose to or was able to implement 
only some of these reforms while he neglected others. In Boston, 
for instance, the aspects of professionalism that were stressed 
most vigorously were those that focused attention on the behavior 
and integrity of the individual officer. Far less emphasis was 
placed on issues like training and the Implementation of new 
technology than was found in other police departments. Throughout 
the nation however, and in Boston especially, professionalization
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communicated one message to the patrolman quite cl early* the 
expectations that were placed on the police officer were to be 
higher than ever b e f o r e . 20
To some degree, professionalization also had an Impact on the 
urban policeman's own perception of his Job, even though the 
results of this change were not always quite what the reformers 
had expected. Samuel Walker contends that "reformers succeeded In 
stabilizing the career patterns of police officers and introducing 
the first rudimentary sense of police work as a profess1on."21 The 
Boston Globe observed in 1918 that visitors to the city remarked 
on the Boston policeman's "pride of profession.-22 The majority of 
Boston's policemen seem to have viewed police work as a long-term 
career, not simply as a Job to be held until something better came 
along. The typical new recruit was between 25 and 30 years of age, 
and nearly all left other occupations in order to Join the force. 
As the information below indicates, the attrition rate for those 
who completed their first year on the force was fairly low and 
tended to decline, albeit haltingly, during the early twentieth 
century:
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Year Number Percent of N remaining:
appointed to remaining 5 years 10 years 15 years
Boston Police after 1 year after after after
Force (N) appointment appointment appointment
1900 123 93% 79% 68%
1901 70 91% 76% 67%
1902 13 92% 77% 62%
1903 98 95% 87% 76%
1904 90 90% 83%
1905 42 88% 79%
1906 37 92% 64%
1907 111 96% 90%
1908 145 95% 91%
1909 88 94%
1910 51 96%
1911 57 95%
1912 103 96%
1913 82 96%
Absenteeism likewise remained low and generally declined during
this period:
Average daily absence rate for Boston Police Department
1891-1918
1891 2.65% 1900 2.17% 1910 1.83%
1892 3.10% 1901 2.18% 1911 1.62%
1893 2.92% 1902 2.14% 1912 1.91%
1894 2.43% 1903 2.24% 1913 1.85%
1895 2.05% 1904 2.02% 1914 1.69%
1896 2.07% 1905 1.92% 1915 1.80%
1897 2.13% 1906 1.77% 1916 1.85%
1898 2 .21% 1907 2.23% 1917 1.75%
1899 2.83% 1908 1.61% 1918 2.17%
1909 1.68%
This data, taken together with the decline in the number of
officers convicted by department trial boardsi, indicates that the
typical policeman of early twentieth-century Boston planned on
remaining with the department for a significant portion of his
working life and, whether due to an increased commitment to his
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profession or to the tighter discipline of the O'Meara years, 
appeared to execute his duties as a policeman with an increasing 
consc1ent1ousness.23
In fact, policemen throughout the country experienced an 
upsurge in occupational identity at this time. National 
periodicals directed not at reformers and administrators but at 
the patrolmen themselves appeared during this period. Among these 
were the National Police Magazine, founded in 1912, Pol Iceman's 
Monthly, established in 1915, and Policeman's News, which first 
appeared in 1919. Between 1890 and 1915, police departments in 
most large cities also formed policemen's fraternal or benevolent 
organizations. These groups provided rank-and-file patrolmen with 
death benefits and health insurance, as well as social and 
recreational activities. In general, these organizations operated 
Independently of the police department itself. The policemen in 
Boston formed such a group, which they named the Boston Social 
Club, in 1906. Its membership was open to any of the city's 
patrolmen but was closed to officers of higher rank. In 1915, a 
national Fraternal Order of Police was created, and many of the 
local clubs affiliated themselves with this organization.24
Nevertheless, professionalization also generated frustration 
among the nation's policemen. Many policemen deemed the new 
policies to be impractical, unnecessary and unsolicited 
interference with a system which, in their eyes, had worked well 
for years. The end of partisan influence in the force, the 
elimination of many of the services that the police had
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traditionally provided, and the new attention to the eradication 
of corruption all robbed the patrolmen of many long-standing 
avenues for supplementing their salaries through petty graft, but 
the reformers7 failure to convince city governments to 
significantly increase the patrolmen/s legitimate salary meant 
that little was done to replace the income that was lost due to 
the elimination of such practices. Furthermore, the higher 
standards of conduct demanded by the professional ideal not only
increased the demands that were placed on the patrolmen but also,
at times, confronted the policeman with conflicting expectations. 
For example, the police were told to behave like a military outfit 
that was waging a war on crime but, at the same time, they were 
instructed to respect the constitutional rights of the suspect, to 
refrain from the improper use of force, and to stay within the 
bounds of the law at all times. At the very moment that he was
told that he was chosen because of his unique abilities and that
he should be proud of his important position as the community's 
crime-fighting expert, the policeman was subject to increasing 
scrutiny and was held ever more accountable by his superiors, thus 
limiting his discretionary power. Finally, the services that were 
eliminated when the scope of police work was narrowed, services 
such as returning lost children or providing aid to the poor, 
often tended to be those functions that brought the policeman into 
the closest and most positive contact with the working class from 
which he originated. While enabling the patrolman to focus his 
attention on crime fighting, then, professionalization also served
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to alienate the policeman from his own social group. His 
interaction with the rest of the working class took on a 
predominantly negative cast, since, in most cases, it now involved 
either arrests or the forceful maintenance of order.26
In the end, professionalism surrounded the patrolman with 
contradictions. It focused great attention on the discretionary 
aspects of police work, while at the same time it demanded 
adherence to Increasingly rigid procedural regulations. It made 
strides toward upgrading the patrolman's skills, leading him to 
expect greater freedom of action, and then it placed him under 
closer supervision than ever before. It impressed upon him the 
idea that, somehow, his role was more important than most, but 
then it used this same argument to deprive him of rights that were 
exercised by other citizens. It encouraged him to take pride in 
himself and his work, but then it demanded that he drastically 
alter both his behavior and his attitudes. It sent him into the 
neighborhood in which he had grown up and Instructed him to remain 
strictly Impartial. It made extraordinary performance the expected 
norm. It led him to expect more from his Job at the very moment 
that it popularized the idea that it was the policeman's duty to 
obediently make any sacrifice that his community demanded of him. 
Perhaps most significantly, however, it tried to instill in him a 
middle-class dedication to a career that brought him a salary and 
a social status that were no greater than those of the average 
ski 1 led worker.26
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Reformers and police administrators were relatively 
unsuccessful In their attempts to reshape the patrolman and make 
him fit into their professional model. Samuel Walker and Eric 
Monkkonen contend that, while the reformers were quite successful 
at professionalizing police executives, they never completely 
eliminated the working-class nature of the policeman's values and 
attitudes. This, of course, just added to the tensions within the 
police department. While professionalization did generate a 
significant degree of frustration for the policeman, however, it 
also gave him a desire to correct those aspects of his work that 
he found dissatisfying. As Walker points out, a worker who views 
his Job as temporary is likely to seek a better occupation if he 
is unhappy with the present one. A person who perceives his Job to 
be a life-long career and who identifies himself with that career 
will seek resolutions within his field of work. The growing 
occupational identity apparent among the patrolmen of Boston and 
other cities implanted in them a willingness to agitate within 
their departments for improved working conditions instead of 
looking to other occupations for these improvements. This type of 
behavior, of course, did not resemble the pliant obedience 
expected by reformers and police administrators. 27
In addition, their growing occupational identity gave 
policemen a vehicle through which to voice their dissatisfaction 
in the shape of the policemen's clubs which emerged during this 
period. These agencies eventually came to serve as policemen's 
advocates, communicating the patrolmen's grievances to police
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officials and lobbying, sometimes successfully, for outcomes that 
were In the patrolmen/s best Interests. In 1907, for example, the 
Boston Social Club was able to convince the state legislature to 
pass a bill guaranteeing each patrolman one day off in fifteen. 
Reformers and ackninistrators looked upon this with great concern. 
In 1912, the reformer George McCaffrey made the following
observation about the Boston Social Club:
A line of activity of more doubtful value, into
which the club has been led, is the pushing of the
wants of patrolmen...1 sincerely hope that this 
kind of activity will not become so prominent that 
it will be necessary to dissolve a unique 
organization, otherwise very commendable.28
Such activity laid the foundation for the police union movement 
that was to emerge during World War I. In the days before police 
reform, when the policeman's position had been wholly dependent 
upon his ability to remain in favor with the politicians who 
appointed him, union activity by patrolmen had been inconceivable. 
Samuel Walker points out that the irony of the police reform 
movement lies in the fact that professionalization made police 
unionism possible and, in Walker/s opinion, inevitable.29
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CHAPTER IV
DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
While the professional ideal led police departments to expect 
more from their patrolmen, it also prompted patrolmen to expect 
more from their Jobs. As a result, a significant gap began to 
develop between the level of compensation that the patrolman 
expected in return for the higher levels of performance demanded 
of him and the actual compensation that police departments 
offered. This gap widened during the first twenty years of this 
century, generating an increasing amount of dissatisfaction within 
the ranks of police departments throughout the nation. Although 
expected to display more self-control and a greater dedication to 
his work than the average working-class employee, the policeman 
was granted neither a salary nor a level of respect that would 
have provided him with a social status above that of the skilled 
worker. The policeman's new occupational awareness, a legacy of 
the professionalization movement, eliminated any inclination he 
may have once had to Just passively accept these circumstances. 
When the economic impact of World War I threatened to further 
undermine both their financial security and their relative social 
standing, policemen throughout the United States decided to take 
action in defense of their own interests.
The policemen of Boston shared in the growing discontent 
observable within the ranks of the nation's urban police 
departments. To some degree, their grievances can be attributed to
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conditions that resulted from the various reforms to which the 
department had been subjected between 1885 and 1915. The arrival 
of World War I only served to exacerbate these problems. At the 
same time, the conditions that these reforms had created closed 
most of the avenues of redress which, under other circumstances, 
might have enabled the policemen to secure acceptable solutions to 
their problems. Finally, the command structure that had emerged as 
a result of the reforms made the chances for the resolution of 
discord within the department largely dependent upon the police 
commissioner's attitudes, on his relationship with the 
rank-and-file patrolmen, and on their perception of the degree to 
which he sympathized with their needs. During the adninlstration 
of a commissioner who was capable of winning the respect of the 
patrolmen, a commissioner like Stephen O'Meara, for example, 
discontent could be contained. Under O'Meara's successor, Edwin U. 
Curtis, it could not.
The establishment of state control over the Boston Police 
Department was, to a significant degree, responsible for the rise 
of many of the conditions that generated dissatisfaction among the 
city's policemen. State control, implemented as a means of 
shielding the department from the Influence of local officials, 
did have the effect desired by its promoters. The Boston Police 
Department's ability to operate with a minimum of 
politically-motivated interference earned it national recognition 
during the early 1900's. The very success of this reform, however,
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hampered the department's ability to Improve working conditions 
for its own patrolmen.
During the late 1600's, state governments eagerly assumed the 
authority for appointing city police officials. They were not so 
eager, however, to begin footing the bill for the police 
departments. As a result, while they stripped city officials of 
the right to choose police acknlnlstrators, they forced the city 
governments to retain the responsibility for financing the police 
departments. Fearing that city officials would simply undermine 
the power of the state-appointed police acininistrators by grossly 
underfunding the departments, most legislatures that instituted 
state control passed accompanying legislation mandating that city 
officials fully fund all requisitions made by the police 
commissioners. In Kansas City, the city council was required by 
state law to appropriate sufficient funds to cover the board of 
police commissioners' estimate of expenses for the coming year, 
and then to fully fund any additional requests made during the 
year to cover expenses that were not foreseen when the board's 
original estimate was made. Members of the municipal assembly in 
Saint Louis could be fined $1000 and could be forever disqualified 
from holding municipal office as punishment for refusing to fully 
fund the budget submitted by that city's police board. City 
officials protested that such measures promoted unrestrained 
spending of city funds by an administrator who was not responsible 
to the city or to its voters. This, they argued, could easily 
drive a city to bankruptcy. In response to these complaints, some
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states enacted legislative safeguards designed to offer a degree 
of protection to city treasuries. Host often, these came In the 
form of limits on the number of men that a police department was 
allowed to employ.*
The General Court of Massachusetts, like most other state 
legislatures, passed measures designed to ensure adequate funding 
for the police department when it established a state-controlled 
police board for Boston in 1885. According to section 4 of chapter 
323 of the state laws of that year, "all expense for the 
maintenance of buildings, the pay of the police and all incidental 
expenses incurred in the acknlnistration of the said police shall 
be paid by the said city of Boston upon the requisition of said 
board." The state legislature, however, granted city officials an 
unusual degree of control over certain portions of the police 
department/s budget. According to section 5 of the same law:
said board of police shall not appoint any larger 
number of patrolmen than the present police 
commissioners of said city are now authorized to 
appoint, except as authorized by said city, nor 
shall the pay of the police be increased or 
diminished except by the concurrent action of said 
city and said board of police.2
While municipal officials in many cities with state-controlled 
police departments had the power to limit the size of the police 
force, it was not so common for them to have such direct control 
over the salaries of the departments personnel. The 1906 act 
replacing the police board with a single police commissioner 
further specified that only the mayor was to have the power to
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authorize an expansion of the police force and that the 
policemen's salaries could only be altered by concurrent action of 
the mayor and the police commissioner. The only salaries that 
could be raised or lowered without the mayor's consent were those 
paid to the police commissioner and the departments 
superintendent. These salaries were to be set by the governor and 
the state legislature but paid by the city. Thus, municipal 
officials were prevented from attempting to alter a police 
commissloner's policies by using his salary as a source of 
leverage. The 1906 law also reaffirmed the mandate that required 
the city to fully fund all expenses incurred by the police 
department upon the request of the police commissioner.3
Not only was the mayor able to control both the size of the 
force and the salaries paid to the men, but the city also retained 
the power to set the rates for the policemen's pensions. The mayor 
of Boston was thus able to exercise considerable control over 
those portions of the police department's budget that had the most 
direct impact on the patrolmen. During the years from 1900 to 
1920, spending for salaries and pensions constituted the 
department's two largest expenses. Together they generally 
accounted for 85% to 90% of the police department's annual budget. 
This gave city officials considerable control over the police 
department's total expenditures, and they did not hesitate to 
employ this power in order to minimize the department's cost to 
the city. In 1915, for example, the city's appropriations to the 
police department constituted a smaller share of the city's budget
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than did similar appropriations In the two other cities of 
comparable size that had state-controlled police departments.
While Baltimore allocated 13.0% of Its budget to the police, and 
Saint Louis appropriated 14.8%, the Boston Police Department 
received only 11.3% of the funds distributed by the city that 
year. Philadelphia, whose department was under direct local 
control, devoted 13.8% of its budget to police expenses.
Throughout the late 1800's and into the twentieth century, 
however, the mayors of Boston repeatedly argued for even stricter 
limits on the department's spending. Shortly after his election in 
1898, Mayor Jos1 ah Quincy, for example, unsuccessfully pushed for 
a bill that would have prevented Increases in police department 
spending from exceeding increases In the city's financial 
resources.4
Unable to directly control other police department decisions 
or to utilize the department as a source of patronage, Boston's 
mayors rarely saw a reason to authorize increases in those 
portions of the department's budget that were under their control. 
Increasing the amount of money allocated to the police, after all, 
might require reducing the funds promised to those departments in 
which the mayor and council still retained some significant direct 
influence. Hostility between the city's Democratic mayors and its 
Republican police commissioners also introduced significant 
tension whenever the city's budget was redrawn. In fact, in spite 
of laws to the contrary, the city government sometimes even tried 
to avoid funding those portions of the police budget that were
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beyond its control. For example, in 1910, shortly after he had 
succeeded in blocking Mayor John J. Fitzgerald's attempt to 
appoint four special police to the force, O'Meara was forced to 
write a letter to the mayor to complain that the sum appropriated 
by the city for the operation of the department during the coming 
fiscal year was less than the amount that O'Meara had requested. 
Eventually, Fitzgerald acceded to the police commissioner's 
request and granted additional funds to make up the deficiency in 
the original appropriation. For all but two of the years that 
O'Meara served as police commissioner, the mayor's office was 
occupied by either Fitzgerald or his rival within the Democratic 
Party, James Michael Curley. According to Francis Russell,
“neither Fitzgerald nor Curley was Interested in Improving the 
conditions of a department over which they had no control and 
through which they could parcel out neither Jobs nor favors.-5
As a result of such conditions, salary increases for the 
patrolmen were few and far between. The salary scale that had been 
established in the late 1880's, for example, was still in effect a 
quarter of a century later. In 1913, after four years of lobbying 
by the Boston Social Club, Mayor Fitzgerald finally authorized the 
adoption of a new scale shortly before he left office. According 
to the new salary schedule, new recruits, known as reserve men, 
were to receive $730 during their first year on the force, $821.25 
during their second year and $912.50 during their third year. 
During the second year, reserve men were eligible for promotion to 
the rank of first-year patrolman, but since such a promotion
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depended upon the existence of a vacancy in that rank, men 
sometimes remained in the reserve ranks a little longer than two 
years. Once he attained the rank of patrolman, the officer 
received a salary of $1000, which was Increased by $100 each year 
until a maximum of $1400 had been reached. This salary scale had 
originally been devised in 1898, but fifteen years of wrangling 
within the ranks of City Hall had delayed the adoption of the new 
schedule. During the intervening years, the cost of living had 
risen by 37*. The pay Increase was also not enough to close the 
gap between the salaries of the Boston Police Department and those 
offered in other cities. In Baltimore, for example, first-year 
patrolmen received $1014 per year, in Philadelphia $1037, in Saint 
Louis $1080, in Pittsburgh $1095 and in New York $1250.*
Shortly after it was enacted, however, the pay increase came 
under attack from City Hall. Curley succeeded Fitzgerald in office 
in 1913. Early the following year, the mayor summoned Police 
Commissioner O'Meara to his office and asked that the police 
commissioner accede to the mayor's request that the pay Increase 
be rescinded for 200 of the department's members. Curley justified 
his request by claiming that the funds were needed by other 
departments. The city's finance commission complained that the 
previous mayor had timed the salary Increase "so as to embarrass 
the succeeding administration.1 O'Meara, citing the detrimental 
effect that such a move would have on morale, refused to give his 
consent to the salary reduction. Furious with the police 
commissioner's refusal to comply, Curley tried to have a bill
65
Introduced Into the state legislature which would have given the 
mayor the power to reduce police salaries without the concurrent 
action of the police commissioner. The legislation was never 
adopted, however, and O'Meara maintained his stubborn refusal to 
accede to the wage cut, so the new salary schedule was retained. 
The incident prompted O'Meara to write in his annual report for 
that year:
the members of the force, after having waited 
twenty-five years for increased salaries, after 
having kept their claim continuously for four 
years before the mayor, and after having had it 
granted in two installments, are not likely to be 
successful applicants for further increase in the 
next twenty-five years.
The salary scale was not the only issue that troubled the 
policemen of Boston during the early 1900's. Many of the men also 
complained that excessive numbers of duty hours were required of 
them. Day men worked 73 hours per week, night men 83 hours and 
wagon men 98 hours. With the exception of the measure guaranteeing 
one day off in fifteen that the Boston Social Club had convinced 
the state legislature to pass in 1907, this schedule had been in 
effect without change since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Duty details in the Boston Police Department were based on what 
was known as the "three-platoon" system. One of the disadvantages 
of this system was that it allowed the men shorter periods of 
leisure time and required longer duty periods than the 
five-platoon system employed by the New York City Police 
Department. Boston patrolmen, for example, worked shifts of either
66
seven or ten hours, while in the five-platoon system the maximum 
length of a shift was six hours. Furthermore, in the five-platoon 
system, each man was given one day off in five, Instead of one in 
fifteen. In addition to the hours of regular duty, the policemen 
were frequently called on to perform tasks such as appearing in 
court or providing security for a parade on their days off. On 
such occasions they were not granted additional pay to compensate 
for the extra work. Until the summer of 1919, the patrolmen were 
not even allowed to leave the city limits without permission from 
their division captains in order to ensure their availability in 
cases of emergency. According to Patrolman James Long, "We had no 
freedom, no home life at all. Ve couldn't even go to Revere Beach 
without the captain's permission."8
While their duty schedules remained unchanged during much of 
the early part of the twentieth century, the amount of work 
expected of the Boston police increased dramatically. Contrary to 
the reform ideals of the day, the Massachusetts General Court did 
not accede to O'Meara's requests that the department be relieved 
of tasks unrelated to crime fighting. The state, in fact, often 
added to the list of functions that the police were required to 
perform. This did not mean, however, that the department neglected 
to fight crime. On the contrary, in accordance with the teachings 
of police reformers and the demands of local moralists, the Boston 
Police Department intensified its efforts to rid the city of crime 
and vice. The number of arrests made by the Boston Police 
Department grew from 48,358 in 1905 to 108,556 in 1917, an
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increase of 124%. The combined number of patrolmen and reserve 
men, on the other hand, rose from 1105 to 1467 during the same 
period, an increase of only 33%. During this period, the Boston 
police made twice as many arrests as the police in Baltimore and 
Saint Louis, two cities of comparable size. This level of activity 
taxed both the individual patrolman and the force as a whole. As 
early as 1912, George McCaffrey observed that “the department is 
somewhat undermanned and a considerable doubling up of routes is 
necessary whenever any exceptional demands are made upon the 
force.* World War I further increased the burden that was placed 
on the police department. By November 30, 1917, the police had 
performed more than 20,000 extra tours of duty in conjunction with 
war-related activities that were beyond their normal scope of 
responsibi1ity.9
O'Meara's attempts to convince city officials to increase the 
size of his force, a precondition for reducing the patrolmen's 
hours and work-load, generally met with failure. The 100 
additional men hired in 1907 to enable the department to give each 
patrolman one day off in fifteen constituted the only large 
increment that the city authorized during this period. In August 
1910, O'Meara said that an additional 119 men were urgently needed 
by the force. Mayor Fitzgerald, implying that any deficiency in 
manpower was probably caused by mismanagement, responded to 
O'Meara's request by saying, "It is fair to inquire whether the 
city should undertake to augment its present police force at so
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heavy an expense until every measure for the development of 
efficiency with the present numbers has been exhausted.
The city was also reluctant to adequately fund the 
construction or repair of station houses, even though such work 
was badly needed. In 1917, four of the 19 station houses were less 
than five years old, but the rest were all from thirty to sixty 
years old. The station house in Division 2 had been condemned 
several years earlier. The city council drew up plans for a new 
house, discarded those plans and drew up a new set, and then 
shelved those as well. According to a report which 0/Heara filed 
with the city council in 1917, ten of the houses were in need of 
repair. Meanwhile, the men complained about vermin, overcrowding 
and insufficient numbers of beds, bathtubs and toilets, especially 
in the older houses located downtown. The city, however, failed to 
act.11
Until 1917, therefore, the majority of the patrolmen's 
complaints were the direct result of underfunding by a city 
government that saw no need to spend large sums of money on a 
department that it could not control. By the end of O'Meara's 
administration, however, the men began to express dissatisfaction 
with some conditions that originated within the department Itself. 
They began to complain that division captains showed favoritism 
when handing out work details and recommending officers for 
promotion. Like the police reformers, the patrolmen began to 
object to tasks such as the inspection of lodging houses, the 
observation of the polls and the delivery of city tax bills which
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they increasingly came to regard as unrelated to real police work. 
Furthermore, while the professional ideal may not have completely 
transformed the patrolman's outlook, it did lead him to resent 
some of the degrading personal errands, such as fetching meals and 
newspapers, which his superiors often demanded of him.12
Thus, by the beginning of 1917 the policemen of Boston had 
compiled a long list of grievances. Their discontent, however, was 
to grow dramatically during the course of the next two and a half 
years. The First World War had a devastating impact on the 
policeman/s economic position. The war generated huge profits for 
industry and a tremendous demand for labor that was translated 
into dramatic wage increases for workers in private industry. For 
policemen, firemen, and other public officials whose salaries were 
not as responsive to fluctuations in the labor market, this 
brought a significant decline in relative economic status. A 
Boston policeman making the maximum weekly salary of $27 could 
easily find himself arresting a worker who was making $75 to $100 
a week at one of the city's booming shipyards or munitions 
factories. By the time the war ended, veteran Boston policemen 
were earning half as much as carpenters and mechanics. Motormen 
and conductors on the city's streetcars, who occupied positions 
that many of the policemen had held before they Joined the force, 
were earning 50 cents a day more than veteran police officers.*3
An increased demand for goods, coupled with wartime 
shortages, generated rampant price increases that posed an even 
graver threat to the policeman's economic position. Between
70
December 1914 and December 1919, the cost of living in Boston 
nearly doubled. In 1919, the U.S. Department of Labor reported 
that prices for basic foodstuffs sold in the city had risen by 81% 
since 1913. The price of potatoes in Boston had risen from 1.8 
cents a pound to 3.7 cents; eggs were up from 32 cents to 67 cents
a dozen; the price of a pound of pork chops had risen from 23
cents to 45 cents. The patrolmen were also hit hard by the
doubling of clothing prices, for each man on the force was
required to provide his own uniform and various other pieces of 
equipment. Wartime inflation pushed the total cost of these 
Job-related purchases to an all-time high of $207, or one fifth of 
a first-year patrolman/s annual salary. Unfortunately, the signing 
of the armistice that ended the fighting in November 1918 failed 
to provide any relief for the beleaguered patrolmen. Reconversion 
to a peacetime economy took time, so the shortages and Inflation 
persisted, accompanied now by staggering Increases in unemployment 
as factories laid off workers and four million demobilized 
soldiers re-entered the labor market.14
Wartime inflation prompted the Boston Social Club to begin 
agitating for another salary increase in 1917. Police Commissioner 
0/Heara sympathized with his men but urged them to have patience; 
the city was not likely to accede to their request while the war 
was on. Then, on December 14, 1918, O'Meara died suddenly of a 
cerebral hemorrhage.1®
During his tenure as police commissioner, O'Meara had earned 
a great deal of respect both within Boston and throughout the
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nation. In its tribute to O'Meara published shortly after his 
death, the Boston Globe wrote, "Before his first term had expired 
It began to be noised about the land that Boston had a police 
department of peculiar excellence."16 An article in Human Life had 
referred to him as "Stephen O'Mearas Police Chief Extraordinary". 
Both O'Meara and his department were praised for displaying a 
degree of integrity and freedom from scandal rarely found in city 
police departments of the day. When Governor Eugene Foss, the 
Democrat in office at the end of O'Meara's first five-year term, 
was urged by members of his party to replace the Republican police 
commissioner, Foss responded, "show me a Democrat as honest, as 
intellectual as Stephen O'Meara and I'll appoint him."17 Foss then 
proceeded to reappoint O'Meara. The commissioner was also 
well-liked by the men in his department. His Irish-Catholic 
background provided him with an Important link to a large portion 
of the force. Furthermore, as commissioner O'Meara had developed a 
reputation for being firm but fair with his men. After his first 
year in office, the Globe wrote, "members of the whole department 
are frank in their expression of confidence in their 
ruler....Today the commissioner is more popular with the men than
any commissioner in recent memory.*16 O'Meara himself showed his
concern for the well-being of his men when he wrote:
All policemen and employees who ask to see the
police commissioner are received by him with 
courtesy and a helpful spirit....In the past eight 
years hundreds of members of the department have 
discussed privately with the commissioner their 
troubles and their aspirations.19
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While he demanded a lot from his men, O'Meara also openly 
displayed his respect for them. His annual reports were filled 
with comments that conveyed pride In the quality of his force and 
in its performance. Actions such as his refusal to rescind the 
1913 wage increase convinced the police that O'Meara looked out 
for the interests of the men In his department and was willing to 
defend them from any external threats. After his death, one of his 
former patrolmen characterized O'Meara as "the fairest man anyone 
could hope to deal with."20 His passing was mourned by both his 
men and the community they served.
O'Meara's successor, Edwin Upton Curtis, had been cut from a 
different mold. According to William Allen White, Curtis "embodied 
the spirit of traditional inherited wealth, traditional inherited 
Republicanism, traditional inherited skepticism about the capacity 
of democracy for self-government, and a profound faith in the 
divine right of the propertied class ultimately to r u l e ."2* Curtis 
was from a Yankee family which had settled in Roxbury seven 
generations earlier. In 1882, he completed his studies at Bowdoin 
College in Maine, and three years later he began practicing law. 
His political interests and his loyalty to the Republican Party 
led him to take a position as secretary for the party's Boston 
City Committee, and in 1889 he was elected city clerk. Five years 
later, at the age of 33, Curtis became the youngest man ever to be 
elected mayor of Boston. Upon completion of his one-year term, 
however, Curtis was defeated in his bid for re-election by Jos1ah 
Quincy III, who had the support of Martin Lomasney and other
73
Democratic ward bosses. Curtis was never again to be nominated for 
elected office. He did, nonetheless, hold a series of appointed 
posts: In 1896, he was appointed to the Metropolitan Park 
Commission, in 1906, he was made assistant U.S. treasurer In 
Boston, and in 1909 he was chosen by President Taft to serve as 
collector of customs for the Port of Boston.22
Curtis had very little sympathy for the working class. As 
mayor, he had been known for his hostility to organized labor. 
Curtis was particularly suspicious of Boston's Irish. Their 
emergence as a powerful political force had crowded old Yankee 
families like his own out of power in the city, and it was their 
leaders who had brought his own career in electoral politics to a 
premature close. It was this man, described by one observer as 
"stiff-necked as an old-time Salem preacher and stubborn as a 
horse mackerel," who assumed command of the predominantly Irish, 
working-class Boston Police Force at the very moment when 
discontent within the force was mounting.^3
Succeeding in office a man as we11-respected as Stephen 
O'Meara would have been a challenge for anyone. From the outset, 
however, Curtis's own actions rapidly undermined his relationship 
with the men under his command. On December 30, 1918, the very day 
that outgoing Governor Samuel McCall acbninistered the oath of 
office to Curtis, the Boston Social Club held a meeting to discuss 
strategies for securing a raise in salary. Although Curtis 
personally supported a salary increase, his first public 
statement, carried in the newspapers the next day, seemed to
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betray a certain lack of sympathy for the plight of his men. After 
vowing to consult with the mayor on the subject of salaries,
Curtis said, "Knowing the membership of the department by 
reputation we are confident that they will gratefully accept our 
final decision." He went on to say that "any member of the police 
department who is so dissatisfied that he cannot perform his work 
faithfully, honestly, and cheerfully, pending the decision 
regarding the requested salary Increase, may resign."24
Shortly after his appointment to office, representatives from 
the Boston Social Club asked to meet with the new commissioner to 
discuss the salary issue and a number of other grievances. Even 
though he had never given the patrolmen's organization any say in 
the running of the department, Commissioner O'Meara had always 
been willing to discuss problems with the club's spokesmen.
Curtis, on the other hand, refused to meet with the men. Instead, 
he established a new grievance committee to be made up of elected 
representatives from each of the department's divisions. This 
move, however, just generated more controversy. The ballots cast 
in the elections to chose the new committee were counted in 
private by the division captains and were reported secretly to the 
commissioner. Rumors that, in at least one case, the returns had 
been falsified flew through the department. The grievance 
committee, as a result, never gained the confidence of the 
majority of the patrolmen. The committee was also unable to 
accomplish anything. It met once, on Curtis's order. No subsequent 
meeting was scheduled, and when the president of the committee,
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Michael Lynch, asked when the next meeting would take place,
Curtis responded, “Search me!“25
Curtis did take steps to address some of the men's complaints 
on his own. In the spring of 1919, for example, he created a 
committee of officers of rank who were instructed to inspect and 
report on the condition of every station house in the city. Curtis 
then forwarded this report along with his own recommendations for 
improvements to the mayor. Despite Curtis's insistence that 
extensive repairs were “imperatively necessary", the city took no 
action.26
At the same time, however, Curtis took steps that limited the 
patrolmen's ability to protect their own interests. A few weeks 
after the election of the grievance committee, Curtis imposed an 
order that forbade the men to appear before the state legislature 
without his permission. Since action by the state legislature was 
required in order to alter the city's tax rate, Curtis's measure 
limited the patrolmen's ability to argue in favor of the tax 
increase that was necessary if they were to get a raise in pay. 
That same spring, Curtis further angered the men when he used his 
clout within the Republican Party to ensure that a state law 
restoring a policeman's right to appeal departmental disciplinary 
decisions to the courts included a passage that exempted the 
Boston police from its provisions. Curtis's actions were seen as 
an attempt to protect his own authority at the expense of the 
interests of his men.2^
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Meanwhile, discussion about the men's salaries continued. In 
1917, when the Boston Social Club had first begun to agitate for a 
raise, the police had demanded an increase of $200. After numerous 
delays, the city responded to the men's request In December 1918 
by offering a new salary schedule that would have raised the pay 
of men at the top and at the bottom of the existing scale but 
would have left the salaries of one fourth of the force untouched. 
At a meeting of the Boston Social Club the men rejected this plan, 
voting unanimously to settle for nothing less than an additional 
$200 for every member of the force. Michael Lynch, representing 
the men, told Mayor Andrew Peters that financial distress was 
forcing many policemen to look for jobs outside the department. In 
an interview with local reporters, Lynch said that the men were 
simply unable to make ends meet, and he insisted that "Boston 
should live up to its high ideals." In February, Mayor Peters made 
a counter-offer that would have given each man a 10% raise, or an 
increase of up to $140 per patrolman. Again the men refused to 
compromise. Commissioner Curtis also came out in favor of the full 
$200 increase for all. Peters responded by offering a $200 
increase for men at the top of the pay scale and $100 for all 
others, but once again, the men rejected the offer. Finally, in 
May 1919, Peters granted the demands in full, but griped that he 
had no idea where the city would find the money to cover the 
increase.28
The wage settlement failed to end the discontent within the 
department, however. The raise, which amounted to an increase of
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between 14% and 28% for each man, was the first that had been 
granted since 1913, and it did not come close to matching the 106% 
increase in the cost of living that had occurred since that time. 
In fact, during Just the two years since the Social Club had first 
presented its demand for a $200 increase, food prices in Boston 
had risen 27%. Vhile the new maximum salary for a patrolman was 
set at $1600, government economists had determined that $1575 was 
the minimum amount needed to sustain a family of five for a single 
year. The wage adjustment, of course, also did nothing to 
alleviate dissatisfaction over hours, promotions, discipline and 
the condition of the station houses. Improvements in these areas 
would require even more intense pressure on police and city 
officials. The Boston patrolmen were convinced that they would 
soon be forced to take action again.
The events of 1918 and 1919, in particular the protracted 
struggle over their wage increase, convinced the policemen of 
Boston that, if they hoped to continue to promote their own 
Interests, they would need assistance. Relying on their own 
resources no longer seemed sufficient. In the past, what little 
protection they had enjoyed had been due to the sympathy of the 
police commissioner and the severely limited pressure that the 
Boston Social Club had been able to bring to bear on elected 
officials. Once Curtis assumed office, the former seemed to vanish 
and the latter was undermined. In the face of numerous slights and 
perceived attacks on their position, the men quickly forgot about 
the assistance Curtis had provided in their battle for higher pay.
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As the men saw it, Curtis, in his attempt to bolster his own 
authority, had robbed them of whatever small amount of clout they 
had once been able to exercise. Thus, at the same time that they 
faced deterioration in both their working conditions and their 
economic position, the policemen became convinced that they could 
not count on support from the departments leadership. The history 
of the past 34 years had taught them not to expect any 
consideration from City Hall, and they were now forbidden to go 
directly to the state to plead on their own behalf. Convinced, 
then, that their future well-being depended upon their ability to 
find new sources of pressure to bring to bear on the officials in 
charge, the Boston police began to search for support from outside 
the department. The working-class nature of both the patrolmen and 
their grievances made it logical for them to turn to organized 
labor for this support.
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CHAPTER V
FORMATION OF THE BOSTON POLICEMENS UNION
In turning to organized labor for assistance, the Boston 
police Joined a police unionization movement that had spread 
throughout the United States during the months Immediately 
following the armistice that ended World War I. This movement, in 
turn, was simply one small part of the massive upsurge In union 
activity that followed the war. The goal of the policemen, In 
fact, was to tap the growing strength of organized labor and to 
use It to support their own fight for better working conditions. 
Unionization, however, was not compatible with the goals of the 
police reform movement. Affiliation with labor organizations, 
reformers feared, would compromise the police departments 
independence. Organized action by policemen, particularly action 
designed to put pressure on superiors, was seen as a threat to 
centralized decision-making. Lastly, the police union movement 
made the failure of professionalization readily apparent. The 
professional ideal demanded that the patrolman obey his superiors 
without question and that he dedicate himself to the effective 
performance of his duties to the exclusion of all other 
considerations. Unionization proved Just how limited the 
rank-and-file patrolman's devotion to such principles really was. 
Furthermore, the police union movement showed how unsuccessful 
police reformers had been in their quest to eliminate 
working-class values and attitudes from the police force. As a
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result, both the reformers and those officials who benefited from 
the maintenance of a powerless rank-and-file stood adamantly 
opposed to police unionization and used the arguments incorporated 
in the reform ideal to combat it.
The period from 1915 to 1919 was one of rapid expansion for 
American labor unions. During those years, union membership leaped 
from 2.5 million to over 4 million. By far the largest labor 
organization in the nation was the American Federation of Labor.
By the middle of 1919, the A.F.L, had grown to represent 3.2 
million workers in the United States and Canada, an increase of 
more than a half million over the previous year. Over 70% of the 
unionized workers in the United States belonged to organizations 
that were affiliated with the Federation. The A.F.L. leadership's 
cooperation with the war policies of the Woodrow Wilson 
Administration, along with its success at parlaying participation 
in the war effort into higher pay and improved conditions for 
workers, had brought the A.F.L. tremendous prestige during the 
war. After the war, the nation's economic troubles stimulated even 
further growth as thousands of workers flocked to the A.F.L. in 
hopes that the organization could protect the gains that they had 
made during the war or could help them maintain their economic 
position in the face of postwar inflation.1
Among the many who Joined the organized labor movement during 
and after the war were thousands of public employees. Throughout 
the United States, government agencies were either unable or 
unwilling to provide their employees with the salary increases
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that were needed to keep up with the changing economic conditions 
in the nation. As their earnings lagged farther and farther behind 
those of workers in the private sector and as rising prices 
undermined their standard of living, groups such as firemen, 
teachers, letter carriers, and government clerks formed unions and 
affiliated with larger organizations such as the A.F.L. In 1916, 
Boston's firemen transformed their benevolent organization, the 
Russell Club, into a union and affiliated with the A.F.L. The 
city's library employees formed their own union two years later, 
and by the summer of 1919 the clerks at City Hall were also 
members of an A.F.L. affiliate. All of these municipal employees 
succeeded in Joining the organized labor movement without 
generating very much controversy.2
In 1918, as the war produced heavier workloads and higher 
grocery bills, and as they waged their frustrating battle to 
secure a salary increase, some of Boston's patrolmen also 
discussed the advisability of forming a union and seeking 
affiliation with the A.F.L. When word of this reached Commissioner 
O'Meara, he issued a general order dated June 28, 1918, which 
read, in part:
The police department...exists for the impartial 
enforcement of the laws and the protection of 
persons and property under all conditions. Should 
its members incur obligations to an outside 
organization, they would be Justly suspected of 
abandoning the impartial attitude which heretofore 
has vindicated their good faith as against the 
complaints almost invariably made by both sides in 
many controversies.
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O'Meara called the policemen "their own best advocates" and went 
on to conclude;
I cannot believe that a proposition to turn the 
police force into a union, subject to the rules 
and direction of any organization outside the 
police department, will ever be presented formally 
to its members, but if, unfortunately, such a 
question should ever arise, I trust that it will 
be answered with an emphatic refusal by the 
members of the force who have an intelligent 
regard for their own self-respect, the credit of 
the department, and the obligations to the whole 
public which they undertook with their oath of 
office.3
Thus, O'Meara identified unionization as a move that ran counter 
to the principles of departmental independence and professionalism 
promoted by the police reform movement, and he addressed the move 
by making an appeal to the patrolmen's own commitment to these 
Ideals. O'Meara had the order read to every policeman at roll 
call, and he submitted it to the press. Talk of unionizing the 
force soon died down.
During the summer of 1918, when talk of unionization was 
first heard among the ranks of Boston's patrolmen, it would not 
have been possible for the policemen to affiliate with the A.F.L. 
anyway. For over twenty years, the leaders of the A.F.L. had 
refused to grant charters to police unions. This policy had 
originated in 1897, when the Federation's Executive Council 
rejected an application for a charter that had been submitted by a 
group of special police in Cleveland. The Council explained its 
stand by saying, "it is not within the province of the trade union 
movement to specially organize policemen, no more than to organize
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militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are too often 
controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement."4
The upsurge of public employee militarism that accompanied 
World War I brought the A.F.L.'s policy into question, however. 
Problems similar to those experienced by the police in Boston had 
persuaded policemen in numerous cities to seek support from the 
A.F.L. They hoped that affiliation with an organization that had 
such a large membership would enable them to bring the pressure of 
thousands of voters to bear on municipal officials. So many 
requests for A.F.L. charters were submitted by policemen's 
organizations that a resolution was adopted at the 1917 A.F.L. 
convention referring the question of police unions to the 
Executive Council for further study. Since the 1890's, the A.F.L. 
leadership, and in particular the organization's president, Samuel 
Gompers, had grown increasingly cautious, so when the Executive 
Council discussed the resolution at their Hay 1918 meeting, it was 
no longer concern about the "forces" that controlled the police so 
much as it was fear of the controversy that police unionism might 
generate that prompted the Executive Council to announce, "it was 
decided to reaffirm our former position that it is inexpedient to 
organize policemen at the present time."^
This did not stem the tide of police unionism, however, and 
policemen's organizations continued to seek membership in the 
A.F.L. In Boston, talk of unionization was revived the following 
winter when the men were embroiled in their salary negotiations 
with Mayor Peters. On February 19, 1919, at a meeting attended by
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over one thousand policemen, the members of the Boston Social Club 
voted to seek affiliation with the American Federation of Labor 
and empowered their executive board to take action on the matter.^ 
The following June, at the A.F.L.'s convention in Atlantic 
City, delegates adopted another resolution regarding police 
unions. This time, however, the delegates did not simply Instruct 
their leadership to look into the question. The resolution passed 
in Atlantic City commanded the officers of the Federation to begin 
Issuing charters to police unions at once. Thus, over the 
objections of Gompers and other leaders, the A.F.L. began to acinit 
police unions to membership during the summer of 1919. The 
response from pollcemen/s organizations was overwhelming. Vithin 
nine weeks, the A.F.L. received applications from 65 policemen's 
organizations in cities throughout the nation. By the end of 
August, the A.F.L. had issued charters to 33 of these, including 
organizations in Los Angeles, Washington, Jersey City, Saint Paul, 
Richmond, Norfolk, Fort Worth and Portland, Oregon.^
Encouraged by the change in A.F.L. policy, the Boston police 
intensified their efforts to form a union. By the last week of 
July, petitions requesting a charter from the A.F.L. were 
circulating in each of the nineteen station houses. When 
Commissioner Curtis heard about the petitions, he issued a general 
order condemning the movement. In this general order, dated July 
29, 1919, Curtis invoked the memory of his predecessor by quoting 
the entire text of the general order that O'Meara had issued the 
previous summer. Curtis then added, *1 am firmly of the opinion
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that a police officer cannot consistently belong to a union and 
perform his sworn duty." Since their duty was to carry out laws 
passed by representatives of the entire population, he said, 
policemen "should not be subject to the orders or the dictation of 
any other organization...that comprises only one part of the 
general public." Curtis finished by saying, "I feel it my duty to 
say to the police force that I disapprove of the movement on foot; 
that in my opinion it is not for the best interests of the men 
themselves; and that beyond question it is not for the best 
interest of the general public." Thus, like O'Meara before him, 
Curtis publicly condemned unionization as a threat to the Boston 
Police Departments widely-touted Independence from outside 
interference. The press agreed with the commissioner; nearly every 
major Boston newspaper condemned the policemens plans for 
affiliation with the A.F.L. Curtis did not, however, go so far as 
to expressly forbid the men from forming a union. Such a step, he 
felt, was unnecessary. To Curtis, it was Inconceivable that the 
patrolmen, whose duty was to show unquestioning obedience to their 
superiors, would continue to pursue a course of action that 
deviated from the announced wishes of the commissioner or that 
challenged the commissionerS authority within open view of the 
general public.®
Three days after Curtis issued his general order, fourteen 
hundred members of the Boston Social Club met to decide what 
action to take next. Commissioner Curtis was invited to address 
the meeting but declined to attend, citing ill health. After
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reviewing the familiar list of grievances, the members of the club 
voted on the issue of affiliation with the A.F.L. Of those 
present, 940, or about sixty-one percent of the total number of 
patrolmen and reserve officers on the force, voted In favor of 
affiliation; all of the rest abstained. The club's officers 
subsequently sent a telegram to the A.F.L. formally requesting a 
charter, and on August 9, the charter arrived In Boston.*
Two days after the Boston police received their charter,
Curtis struck back. Up to this point, he had limited himself to
merely expressing disapproval of the plans to unionize. Upon 
learning that the men had received an A.F.L. charter, however, 
Curtis decided to take action that would bring this affair to a 
speedy close once and for all. On August 11, the commissioner 
promulgated an addition to the department's rules. Curtis 
announced the adoption of section 19, rule 35 in a general order 
that began, "It is or should be apparent to any thinking person 
that the police department of this or any other city cannot 
fulfill its duty to the entire public if its members are subject
to the direction of an organization existing outside the
department." A policeman, he said, "is not an employee but a State 
officer." The new rule, he explained, was designed to prevent the 
policemen and the department
from coming under the direction and dictation of 
any organization which represents but one element 
or class of the community. If troubles arise where 
the interests of this organization and the 
interests of other elements and classes in the 
community conf1 let,...[the officer] must fail in
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his duty as a policeman, or In his obligation to 
the organization that controls him.
The new rule stated that "no member of the force shall Join or 
belong to any organization...which is affiliated with or a part of 
any other organization, club or body outside the department." The 
only exceptions to the rule were veterans' organizations such as 
the American Legion.10
By this point In the conflict, then, Curtis had defined the 
primary issue upon which the battle over unionization would be 
fought: affiliation with the A.F.L. would compromise the 
Independence of the force. In the event of a strike involving 
other A.F.L. members, the patrolman's own membership in an A.F.L. 
affiliate might prejudice his actions, thus Jeopardizing the 
impartiality which the reformers had taught was absolutely vital 
if police service were to be effective. Curtis also invoked parts 
of the professional ideal which asserted that the policeman's 
special position within the community meant that he could not 
expect to be allowed the same rights to promote his own interests 
that private employees exercised, and that acceptance of this 
sacrifice was assumed when the officer took his oath of office. 
Such sentiments were identical to those expressed by nearly every 
police reformer of the day, many of whom Joined with police 
actoinistrators and influential citizens to block the police union 
movement.11
The Boston Social Club's next step was to seek legal advice. 
They hired James Vahey, who was also counsel for the carmen's
88
union, and John P. Feeney. The attorneys argued that Curtis's new 
rule violated a Massachusetts statute forbidding employers to 
compel employees to agree not to Join a union as a condition for 
employment. Curtis's response was that the law did not apply to 
policemen, for they were officers and not employees.12
Finally, the men decided to simply defy the commissioner's 
order. The Boston Social Club scheduled a meeting for August 15 to 
decide whether or not to accept the charter. The day the meeting 
was to be held, Boston newspapers announced that, in a 
none-too-subtle move to convince the policemen to abandon their 
course, Curtis had Just authorized a rush order for the printing 
of one thousand discharge and suspension forms. Rather than 
intimidating the men, this, along with the other actions taken by 
Curtis during the previous three weeks, simply Increased their 
anger and their determination to defend their Interests. At the 
August 15 meeting, they voted overwhelmingly to accept the A.F.L. 
charter establishing Boston Policemen's Union no. 16807. Boston 
now became the largest city in the nation whose police were 
affiliated with the A.F.L. At an organizational meeting held three 
days later, the new union elected its officers. The men chose John 
Mclnnes, a former bricklayer and an ardent supporter of 
unionization, to serve as their first president. On the morning 
after the selection of officers, however, eight of the union's 
leaders were summoned to headquarters for two and a half hours of 
questioning. On August 21, Curtis announced that the eight men
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would be charged with Insubordination for violating section 19 of 
rule 35.13
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CHAPTER VI
THE DECISION TO STRIKE
Reformers had been far more successful at reshaping 
administrative structures than at molding policemen to resemble 
the model that the reformers found most desirable. The Boston 
Police Department exemplified to a large degree the ideals of 
Independence and centralized authority advocated by the police 
reformers. The result was the emergence of a police commissioner 
who, though possessing little control over some key matters such 
as the patrolmen's salaries, was completely autonomous in other 
areas, in particular those regarding discipline and the general 
management of personnel. Unaccountable to the city's government or 
to its voters, free from Judicial interference in personnel 
matters, and appointed for a comparatively long term by a governor 
whom he was likely to outlast in office, the police commissioner 
was free to make any decisions which, in his view, would 
contribute to the department's ability to operate with maximum 
efficiency. The commissioner could make policy without having his 
attention diverted by a need to garner support from city or state 
officials, the patrolmen or the public, or by any other 
considerations that were not directly related to the maintenance 
of effective law enforcement and the conditions that facilitated 
it. This narrowness of perspective, the reformers claimed, was 
essential for the efficient operation of a police force and the 
impartial enforcement of the law.
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In the crisis that was sparked by the Boston patrolmen's 
decision to affiliate with the A.F.L., the autonomy possessed by 
the police commissioner permitted Curtis to make a series of 
decisions that prevented the implementation of a compromise which 
may have averted the subsequent strike. As the conflict 
progressed, maintaining discipline and respect for his authority 
within the department became Curtis's overriding concern. Unlike 
O'Meara, Curtis did not have the ability to accomplish this and, 
at the same time, convince the men that he was concerned about 
their well-being. Curtis's social outlook, his attitudes about his 
men and his own role within the department, his inability to 
present a more amiable public image, and the social distance 
between him and the patrolmen all precluded this. As a result, the 
only option available to Curtis was to force his men back into 
line through a policy of direct confrontation and the unbending 
execution of all departmental regulations. Others recognized that 
the reaction of the policemen, whose mood was becoming 
increasingly militant, was likely to have repercussions far beyond 
the police department itself. Mayor Peters, for example, with an 
eye toward the effect that a policemen's strike would have both on 
his political career and on the city at large, threw himself into 
the affair only to have his suggestions for a compromise cast 
aside by the police commissioner. Instead, Curtis insisted on 
nothing short of an unconditional surrender by the members of the 
policemen's union. In the end, it was this inflexible stance
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assumed by the commissioner that eliminated any possibility of 
preventing the policemen's strike.
Commissioner Curtis was not alone in his determination to 
squash the union movement within his department. Municipal 
officials and police executives in several cities whose policemen 
had received A.F.L. charters put tremendous pressure on the 
members of their departments in an effort to force them to 
relinquish their charters. In August, Mayor Frank Hague ordered 
Jersey City's Commissioner of Public Safety to suspend and bring 
charges against the policemen who had promoted the plan to seek 
affiliation with the A.F.L., along with any other officer who 
subsequently Joined the union. In September, policemen in Buffalo 
abandoned their plans to apply for an A.F.L. charter when the city 
council passed an ordinance forbidding policemen to belong to a 
union. City officials in Terre Haute, Indiana and Norfolk,
Virginia demanded that their policemen either return their 
charters or resign from the force. In Washington, the Board of 
Commissioners of the District of Columbia adopted a rule similar 
to the one promulgated by Curtis. They were blocked from enforcing 
the rule, however, when a restraining order was issued by Justice 
Ashley Gould of the District Supreme Court at the request of the 
Washington Policemen's Union, and when President Wilson 
simultaneously requested that action be delayed until after the 
conference of industrial and labor leaders which he had called for 
October. Nevertheless, in Detroit, the Fraternal Order of Police 
lost its bid to secure a similar injunction to prevent the
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discharge of men who had promoted unionization of that city's 
patrolmen. In all cases, the argument that the authorities used to 
oppose the policemen's unions was the same as that invoked by 
Curtis: affiliation with the A.F.L. would Jeopardize the 
independence of the department and would preclude impartial 
enforcement of the law by the policemen. As Mayor Hague put it, 
"the members would be serving two masters."1
The hearings for the eight leaders of the Boston Policemen/s 
Union took place on August 26. At the request of the union/s 
attorneys, the hearings were not held before a trial board made up 
of three division captains, as was customary, but before 
Coranissloner Curtis himself. Vahey and Feeney wanted to be sure 
that Curtis was forced to take full responsibility for the 
decision, and Curtis himself had no objection to this. The union/s 
attorneys argued again that the commissioner's new rule violated 
state labor statutes and disputed Curtis/s assertion that a 
policeman is an official and not an employee. They further argued 
that affiliation with the A.F.L. would in no way Impede the 
patrolmen's ability to perform their duties effectively, for it 
would have no impact on the police commissioner's power to 
institute disciplinary action in cases of neglect of duty. Upon 
the completion of the testimony, Curtis announced that he would 
take the matter under advisement. Three days later, hearings were 
held for another eleven officers of the union. Again Curtis 
delayed announcing his findings. Up to this point, the Policemen's 
Union had made no official threat of a strike. However, all of
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Boston was talking about the possibility of a police strike should 
the nineteen men be found guilty. Curtis had even taken steps to 
prepare for such an eventuality. Three days before the first set 
of hearings, the police commissioner had announced that a 
volunteer police force would be formed to maintain order in the 
city should an emergency a r i s e . 2
During the summer of 1919, the mere mention of a strike by 
any group of workers was taken seriously. Forces such as rampant 
inflation, an organized labor movement whose membership was 
growing by leaps and bounds, the disappearance of both the market 
for war-related goods and the high profits that came with It, and 
a determination by employers to rescind many of the concessions
that they had been forced to make to workers during the period of
wartime labor shortages all combined to produce a year marked by 
an Inordinate number of labor disputes. In 1919, there were 2,665 
labor disputes involving 4,160,348 workers, or 22% of the nation's 
work force. In every other year from 1916 to 1922, the number of 
workers involved in strikes and walkouts remained between 1 
million and 1.6 million. From actors to transit workers, from bank 
clerks to steelworkers, laborers in all walks of life seemed 
infected by what some newspapers called "strike mania”. Several of 
these strikes attracted nationwide attention. In February 1919, 
Americans witnessed the nation's first significant general strike 
as 60,000 workers responded to a call by the Seattle Central Labor 
Council and walked off their Jobs in support of the city's
striking shipyard workers. A similar Canadian strike also
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attracted a great deal of attention in the United States. The 
general strike called by the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council in 
May to show their sympathy for striking workers in the metal and 
building trades culminated in a virtual take-over of the city 
government by the strike committee. In the United States, the 
number of strikes mounted as the year wore on: there were 175 
labor disputes in March, 248 in April, 388 in May, 303 in June,
360 in July and 373 in August. Then, early in September, Americans 
braced for what promised to be one of the most disruptive strikes 
of the year, a strike against steel manufacturers that would 
eventually Involve 365,000 w o r k e r s . ^
Like residents of many parts of the United States, Bostonians 
were particularly disturbed by the number of strikes that directly 
affected their own area, where the frequency of strikes reached 
its peak during the spring and summer of 1919. The Boston Evening 
Transcript reported that the city experienced no fewer than forty 
strikes during the period from April 30 to August 1 of that year. 
These strikes Involved, among others, garment workers, 
longshoremen, fishermen, carmen on the city's elevated railroads, 
and even the horseshoers. In April, a strike by 20,000 telephone 
operators tied up phone service throughout New England. 
Furthermore, a threatened strike by the city's firemen, who were 
working in conjunction with the police to secure a salary 
increase, was averted at the last minute when the city announced 
that the firemen would get a $200 raise along with the policemen.^
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Traditionally, strikes by American policemen had been quite 
unusual, but during the twelve months that preceded the uproar 
over the creation of the Boston Pollcemen/s Union, Bostonians had 
heard about such strikes frequently enough to know that such an 
event was possible. The police union movement that had emerged in 
the United States in response to the combination of inflation and 
fixed salaries had also surfaced in Canada and in Great Britain, 
where similar conditions prevailed. As a result, all three nations 
experienced police strikes during 1918 and 1919. These strikes 
were generally the result of official opposition to collective 
action by policemen. The first of these strikes occurred in August 
1918, when 6000 members of London's Metropolitan Police Force went 
on strike after a member of the force had been dismissed as 
punishment for his union activity. The strike brought the men a 
substantial pay increase and a promise from the prime minister 
that the dismissed officer would be reinstated. One month later, 
450 policemen in Cincinnati staged a walkout and announced plans 
to seek affiliation with the A.F.L. in response to the suspension 
of five fellow officers. Four of the men had been suspended for 
their part in organizing a meeting to discuss strategies for 
obtaining a salary increase, an event which had led to a scuffle 
between patrolmen and inspectors. The fifth was punished when, in 
a conference with the chief of police held to discuss the original 
suspensions, he likened the chief's administration to autocratic 
rule in Germany. The city's safety director initially threatened 
to dismiss each one of the striking policemen. The strike ended
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after three days, however, when the mayor offered a settlement In 
which city officials agreed to allow the strikers to return to 
work without punishment and to consider reinstating the suspended 
officers in return for a promise that the men would relinquish 
their plans to affiliate with the A.F.L. In December of the same 
year, a strike by Montreal policemen, who demanded higher wages 
and union recognition, sparked several days of looting and 
rioting. Finally, in August 1919, as Bostonians watched the 
conflict between their own police and the city's police 
commissioner unfold, police strikes over union recognition erupted 
again in England, resulting in disturbances in London and two 
nights of rioting in Liverpool, where troops finally had to be 
summoned to restore order.®
By the end of August, Bostonians were discussing not only the 
likelihood of a policemen's strike, but also the very real 
possibility that the city's organized workers as a whole would 
stage a general strike on behalf of the policemen. On August 16, 
the day after the policemen voted to accept the A.F.L. charter, a 
headline in the Boston Herald announced that the city's labor 
leaders planned to stage a general strike if Curtis were to 
dismiss even one of the officers on trial. The next day, the 
Boston Central Labor Union, the coordinating body representing the 
more than 125 A.F.L. locals in the city, held its largest meeting 
in over a decade. The delegates issued a resolution announcing,
"We bid a hearty welcome to the Policemen's Union to the ranks of 
organized labor, and we urge them to maintain their position and
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promise to them every atom of support that organized labor can 
bring to bear in their behalf." The delegates demanded that Curtis 
revoke his rule concerning affiliation with outside organizations, 
condemning it as "un-American and hostile to the Interests of all 
American workers," and as "a tyrannical assumption of autocratic 
authority." The B.C.L.U.'s business agent, P. Harry Jennings, 
aroused the crowd even further by declaring that "every man and 
woman must be ready to make any sacrifice to assist the 
policemen." The delegates then selected a committee of 17 to 
prepare plans for assisting the policemen in their quest for 
recognition of their right to unionize.6
The B.C.L.U. itself did not have the authority to call a 
general strike without the approval of the local unions it 
represented, but by the end of August, many locals were making 
veiled or, at times, open threats to strike if the leaders of the 
policemen's union were discharged. On August 20, the Herald 
announced that all of the city's major unions, including the 
telephone workers, the teamsters, and the workers in the building 
trades, were willing to participate in a general strike which, the 
Herald predicted, could involve as many as 80,000 of the city's 
workers. During the last two weeks of August, the newspaper 
announced that the Plumbers' Union, the Boilermakers' Union, the 
Machinists' Union of Hyde Park, and the Street Car Men's Union had 
all voted to quit work if necessary to support the police. Two 
days before Curtis heard testimony in the case of the first eight 
officers, the B.C.L.U. held another meeting at which the delegates
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unanimously pledged themselves to support the police in any action 
they may be compelled to take. Again the press interpreted this to 
mean that the unions would participate in a general strike. Day 
after day, the newspapers reprinted union leaders7 statements of 
encouragement for the police, their pledges of support, and their 
Increasingly belligerent attacks against Curtis. The fervor of 
these statements and the large number of unions that issued them 
convinced many in Boston that a severe punishment for the 
policemen would lead to a complete shut-down of businesses and 
services In the city.7
Among those who were most concerned about this state of 
affairs was Mayor Peters. The mayor was eager to avoid any 
situation that might result in a complete disruption of the city's 
daily life, as had happened in Seattle and Winnipeg, or, worse, in 
the type of violent chaos that had reigned in Montreal and 
Liverpool. On August 27, Peters issued a statement expressing his 
support for Curtis's position. He reiterated the idea that 
affiliation with the A.F.L. would lead to ■comp1icat ions*, and he 
announced his hope that the Federation and the policemen would 
voluntarily relinquish their plans. However, he also laid the 
groundwork for a possible dialogue with the patrolmen when he 
announced that "no one would deny them the privilege of forming 
among themselves an association which would enable them to secure 
the benefits of collective bargaining." That same day, Peters 
appointed a committee of thirty-four influential citizens to draw 
up a plan to settle the dispute between the policemen and the
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commissioner and to thus prevent a strike. Peters appointed James 
J. Storrow, a prominent Investment banker and, like the mayor, a 
member of the Democratic Party, to head the committee. Storrow's 
first action as chairman was to issue a statement similar to the
one that had been issued by the mayor. In this statement, Storrow
made clear his opposition to a police union affiliated with the 
A.F.L., again citing the danger that this would pose to impartial 
enforcement of the law, but stated that he saw no objection to the 
formation of "their own independent and unaffiliated 
organization." Storrow's second action as chairman was to reduce
the unwieldy committee of 34 to a much more manageable
subcommittee of three.®
Storrow and his subcommittee began the process of hammering 
out a settlement by meeting with representatives of the Boston 
Policemen's Union and their attorneys. In a series of meetings 
that began on August 30, the two groups discussed the working 
conditions within the police department. While Storrow sympathized 
with the policemen's grievances, he continued to Insist that the 
only type of organization that would be acceptable was one that 
remained independent of any body outside the force. President 
Mclnnes of the union countered that the police already had such an 
organization in the Boston Social Club, but that the club had 
become ineffective as a means of improving working conditions. The 
union leaders were determined to hang on to their charter. Mclnnes 
told Storrow, "if we must strike for our rights, it will be a 
struggle to the finish." It was the first time that the union's
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officials had openly stated that the conflict might lead to a 
strike.9
Eventually, however, the union's attorneys began to advise 
the men that there was little likelihood of an agreement that 
would allow them to keep their charter. Police unions in New York 
City and Buffalo had already abandoned their plans to affiliate 
with the A.F.L., and police unions in numerous other cities were 
under great pressure to do likewise. Instead of trying to retain 
the charter, attorneys Vahey and Feeney urged the union's leaders 
to use the issue of affiliation as a bargaining chip in order to 
gain some form of guaranteed improvement in working conditions.^
By September 6, the Storrow Committee and the union's 
attorneys had drawn up a compromise plan which they felt would be 
acceptable to the union's leaders. The plan called for the Boston 
Policemen's Union to relinquish its affiliation with the A.F.L., 
but to continue to operate as an independent organization “for the 
purpose of assisting its members concerning all questions relating 
to hours and wages and physical conditions of work." Second, the 
plan called for the creation of a committee of three citizens to 
be selected concurrently by the mayor, the police commissioner and 
the policemen's union. This committee was to investigate working 
conditions within the department and to report its findings to the 
mayor and the commissioner. The plan also called on the police 
commissioner to agree to meet with representatives of the union 
whenever union leaders felt that a grievance needed to be 
discussed. If at any time in the future the commissioner and the
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policemen's union could not reach an agreement on a particular 
Issue, another citizens' committee was to be formed to investigate 
the problem and to issue recommendations. The Storrow Committee's 
report, however, expressly stated that this system of conflict 
resolution was not to be applied to disputes concerning 
disciplinary action. The plan went on to forbid discrimination by 
police officials against union members or by union members against 
non-members. The final provision of the plan stated that "no 
member of the Boston Policemen's Union should be discriminated 
against because of any previous affiliation with the American 
Federation of Labor."11
The Storrow Committee's compromise plan satisfied the 
commissioner's demand that the police remain independent of 
outside organizations while still providing the men with a new and 
potentially more effective apparatus for securing relief when 
grievances arose. The final provision also would have prevented 
the impending show-down between the police and the commissioner by 
compelling the commissioner to drop the charges against the 
nineteen members of the union. On September 6, Storrow submitted 
his committee's plan to the mayor, who immediately forwarded it to 
Curtis with the endorsement that, "it affords a speedy and, it 
seems to me, satisfactory settlement of the whole question." 
Meanwhile, Vahey and Feeney brought the compromise proposition to 
the union's leaders and urged them to approve it. Later, Storrow 
said that he had been confident at the time that the union's 
leadership was inclined to approve the plan. Vahey and Feeney also
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agreed to address a meeting of the full membership of the union at 
which they planned to advise the men to vote in favor of the 
compromise. When the clty/s Chamber of Commerce received a copy of 
the compromise proposal, they gave It their full support and 
offered to assist in the effort to convince the state and 
municipal officials concerned to approve the terms of the plan.*^ 
By the time the Storrow Committee submitted its 
recommendations to the mayor, Curtis had already announced that he 
would issue his findings in the cases of the nineteen men on 
Monday, September 8. Convinced that a negative finding would 
precipitate a strike, Storrow and Peters hoped to secure the 
commissioner's acceptance of the compromise as soon as possible. 
Shortly after Curtis received a copy of the proposal on Saturday, 
September 6, however, he left Boston for his home in Mahant, where 
he remained for the duration of the weekend. When they failed to 
receive an answer from Curtis concerning the proposal, Peters and 
Storrow decided to present the plan to the press with the hope 
that favorable public opinion might convince the commissioner to 
grant his approval to the plan. Bostonians were thus able to read 
the Storrow Committee's report in their Monday morning papers. In 
the editorial pages of every one of the city's major morning 
newspapers, the compromise plan received unqualified support. The 
Boston Essl, a Democratic paper with a high readership among the 
city's Irish working class, called the plan "a happy solution of 
the whole difficulty" and praised the fact that "there is neither 
victory nor defeat in it." The Post went on to say, “We trust it
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will be speedily agreed to by both sides." The Globe observed that 
the plan provided the police with a way to ensure that their 
grievances were addressed, but that "it does not take away from 
the disciplinary power of the conxnissloner." "For either the 
commissioner or the police to refuse this solution of the 
difficulty would be a grave mistake," the Globe's editors 
insisted. The conservative Boston Herald advised the men to give 
up their A.F.L. charter, for under the terms of the compromise 
plan, "they can have everything else that they are in reason 
entitled to." The editors of the Herald concluded, "Mr.
Curtis...wi11 be most generous to accept this compromise, but we 
expect him to do so, and should so advise him." The Boston 
American called the plan "honorable and Just," and urged, "No one 
should rock the boat. Least of all the public officials. No one 
should stand upon technical rights.
To Curtis, however, the compromise represented at least a 
partial retreat on several points which, in his mind, were 
definitely not negotiable. By suggesting that the charges against 
the nineteen officers be dropped, the recommendations of the 
mayor's committee constituted an intolerable attempt by outsiders 
to interfere with departmental disciplinary procedures. 
Furthermore, granting the men a full pardon for actions taken in 
willful defiance of departmental regulations, he felt, would 
undermine the strict discipline that formed such an important 
component of the professional model. The provisions safeguarding 
the operation of an independent police union and forcing Curtis to
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discuss departmental problems with its leaders promised to create 
conditions that would have posed another permanent challenge to 
the commissioner's authority to run the department in whatever way 
he thought best. Finally, the provisions calling for the 
arbitration of future grievances by a citizens' committee, one of 
whose members would have been appointed by the mayor, constituted 
a violation of the cardinal rule of departmental independence, for 
It would have increased the role that the mayor played In police 
department matters. The idea of allowing Democratic mayors to have 
any more influence over the department than they already had was 
intolerable to Curtis. Over the course of the preceding week, 
Curtis had come to resent the interference by Storrow and Peters 
in what to him was a matter of strictly departmental concern, but 
now they were trying to force him to accept a solution which, in 
his opinion, would significantly weaken the office of the police 
commissioner.
So, in spite of the appeals from the press, Curtis, rejected 
the plan outright. In a letter to Mayor Peters dated September 8, 
Curtis wrote, "The commissioner can find nothing in the 
communication...which appears to him to be either consistent with 
his prescribed legal duties or calculated to aid him in their 
performance.” Curtis also asserted that he saw no legitimate 
reason for the compromise plan to affect his decision regarding 
the charges pending against the nineteen officers. Later, in his 
annual report for that year, Curtis further explained his 
objections to the compromise. In the first place, he saw no reason
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to be negotiating with the union leaders at all. "I have never 
been able to understand," he wrote, "why any one who approved the 
rule and condemned the violation of it would have expected me to 
dicker with its violators, or that I, rather than they, should 
make the offer of compromise." He again insisted that the plan 
could have no bearing on his disposition of the charges pending 
against the officers, and that, therefore, "its merits could 
properly come up for discussion only after the men on trial had 
purged themselves of their violation of a rule of the department." 
Concerning the proposed system for addressing grievances, Curtis 
wrote, "nowhere in the statute by virtue of which the Police 
Commissioner holds office is there any language that authorizes or 
permits him to divide his authority and responsibility with any 
one." Such a system would be incompatible with the commissi oner7s 
duties under the law and "with the sense of responsibility to the 
Commissioner which the members of the force must feel if proper 
discipline and efficiency are to be maintained." Curtis rejected 
the plan as
a reversion to the state of divided 
responsibility, vacillating policy and dilatory 
action, which prompted the Legislature to first 
take control of the police force of Boston...and 
then, later, to still further concentrate 
responsibility by transferring the control to a 
single commissioner.*4
On September 8, Curtis had the report of his findings in the 
cases of the nineteen officers read by the division captains in 
each station house following the evening roll call. The 
commissioner found all nineteen men guilty of violating section 19
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of rule 35, and each was suspended indefinitely. At 9:45 that 
evening, the members of the Boston Policemen's Union began 
balloting to determine whether or nor a strike should be called. 
The final vote was 1134 in favor of a strike, with only 2 opposed. 
The strike was scheduled to begin the next evening. 15
Peters and Storrow, hoping to avert the strike at the last 
minute, sought a way to convince Curtis to reverse his decision 
and to accept the compromise. Their own personal prestige carried 
no weight with the Republican police commissioner, and public 
opinion seemed to have no impact on his decisions, so Peters and 
Storrow asked Governor Calvin Coolidge for assistance. The 
commissioner was a state official, so they had reason to believe 
that Coolidge, both as governor and as a fellow Republican, could 
exercise some Influence over Curtis when no one else could. Up to 
this point, however, Coolidge had characteristically distanced 
himself from the police controversy. Throughout the preceding 
weekend, Storrow and Peters had tried to contact the governor, but 
Coolidge had quietly left the city without leaving word of his 
destination. On Monday evening he returned to Boston after having 
delivered an address before the delegates to the Massachusetts 
Federation of Labor's convention in Greenfield, in the western 
part of the state. In his speech, Coolidge made no mention of the 
Boston police controversy. That day, Peters forwarded a copy of 
the Storrow Report to the governor's office with the request that 
Coolidge give the plan his approval and use his influence to
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convince Curtis to do the same. Later that evening, Coolidge met 
with Peters and Storrow to discuss the matter. ^
Coolidge, however, refused to interfere with the 
commissi oner/s decision. In a letter to Peters dated September 9, 
the day the strike was to begin, Coolidge wrote, "there has arisen 
a confusion which would be cleared up if each person undertakes to 
perform the duties Imposed upon him by law. It seems plain the 
duty of Issuing orders and enforcing their observance lies with 
the Commissioner of Police and with that no one has any authority 
to interfere." Coolidge then remarked that if working conditions 
within the police department were Inadequate, it was the 
responsibility of the mayor and the city council to remedy the 
situation. As for his own role, Coolidge observed, "There is no 
authority in the office of the Governor for interference in the 
making of orders by the Police Commissioner or in the action of 
the Mayor and the City Council....I am unable to discover any 
action that I can take." That same evening, Boston newspapers 
carried the text of a telegram that Coolidge had sent to the 
delegates of the Massachusetts Federation of Labor convention in 
response to their request that Coolidge intervene on behalf of the 
policemen. The telegram read, in part, "The Governor has no 
authority over the appointment, suspension or removal of the 
police force of Boston."17
Having exhausted all possible means of convincing Curtis to 
modify his position, Peters and Storrow braced for the walkout.
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That evening, Tuesday, September 9, 1,117 of the 1,544 patrolmen 
in the Boston Police Department went on strike.1®
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CHAPTER VII 
THE STRIKE AND ITS AFTERMATH
During the first night of the strike, Boston experienced the 
very sort of disorder that Peters and Storrow had hoped to 
prevent. A night that began with a series of relatively harmless 
pranks ended with widespread looting and vandalism in various 
parts of the city. As a result of Curtis's earlier announcement,
"I am ready for anything", city officials had done nothing to 
provide replacement protection should the policemen actually leave 
their posts. Curtis himself, anticipating that the majority of the 
policemen would remain loyal to the department, failed to mobilize 
the volunteer force that the department had recruited during the 
previous weeks. The next morning, Curtis requested that Peters 
call out the state militia units stationed within the city to 
quell the disturbances. The mayor complied with the request, but 
then went a step farther. The 1885 law that had originally 
established state control over the Boston Police Department 
included a provision that empowered the mayor of the city to 
assume temporary control over the department in times of riot and 
disorder. Peters now invoked this provision. Commissioner Curtis, 
as a result, suddenly found himself obligated to obey any orders 
emanating from City Hal 1.1
By the following morning, order had been restored, but only 
after two nights of looting and vandalism had generated $34,000 
worth of damage claims from city businessmen. In addition, the 
riots and the State Guard's subsequent efforts to disperse crowds
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and round up law-breakers resulted In a total of eight deaths. 
Governor Coolidge, though, was distressed by the mayors 
assumption of control over the police department. So, when Peters 
requested that the governor authorize the deployment of additional 
state militia units from outside the city, Coolidge took the 
opportunity to oust Peters from command in much the same way that 
the mayor had dislodged the commissioner. On September 11, one day 
after Peters had taken charge, Coolidge called out the entire 
State Guard of Massachusetts and authorized their use to maintain 
order in Boston. At the same time, he issued a proclamation that 
placed the members of the Boston Police Department under his own 
personal command and required them to obey any orders he might 
issue. His first order commanded Police Commissioner Curtis to 
recommence performing his regular duties and to "obey only such 
orders as I may so issue or transmit." Years later, Coolidge wrote 
in his autobiography that he had taken such steps because he 
feared that, if Curtis had been superseded, "the men that he had 
discharged might be taken back and the cause lost."2
The disorder that accompanied the walkout brought a deluge of 
public condemnation down upon the striking policemen. The Boston 
press universally censured the strikers. The Boston Herald 
commented:
Any body of men, hired to protect the city and 
sworn to defend it, that have no more moral sense 
than to turn the city over to organized bands of 
looters are of the sort that the sooner we are rid 
of them the better. They never should have been 
policemen. They never will be again, if the 
community has an ounce of self-respect.
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The editors of the Evening Transcript insisted that "the blame for 
Boston's black night rests primarily on the shoulders of the 
members of the Boston Police force, who deserted their posts of 
duty...and willfully and deliberately placed their fellow-citizens 
at the mercy of a mob of thieves." The Transcript urged that the 
police "not be allowed to escape proper punishment for their 
criminal course." Even the Boston Post. which had shown greater 
sympathy for the policemen's plight than the rest of the city's 
major newspapers, blamed the striking police for "this saturnalia 
of looting and reckless disorder," and pointed out that, "having 
deserted their posts in a body, they can hardly expect the public, 
which suffers so severely from their action, to approve of it."3
Numerous influential voices joined in condemning the strike. 
The Boston Chamber of Commerce declared that, since "the patrolmen 
deserted their posts of duty," they should all be discharged and a 
new police force should be organized. The results of a survey of 
seventeen sermons delivered in Boston churches on the following 
Sunday showed nearly unanimous condemnation of the strike by the 
city's clergy, as well. The Reverend Sydney B. Snow of King's 
Chapel characterized the strike as an "obvious attempt on the part 
of one class in society to wrest by violence the political control 
into their own hands." The Reverend George R. Stair of the Dudley 
Street Baptist Church praised Commissioner Curtis "for his 
courageous stand in this matter," and went on to demand the 
recruitment of "a new force, one purged entirely from the leaven 
which has caused the present deplorable condition." The Reverend
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Cortland Myers of Tremont Temple told his congregation, "Not one 
of the striking policemen of this city, who trampled on the solemn 
oath they took to maintain law and order, should be put back on 
his Job. I don't want to live In a city with such rotten 
policemen.*4
Word of the strike quickly spread to al1 parts of the nation, 
eliciting even more virulent criticism from the press and from 
public officials outside the city. The Baltimore Sun wrote, "To 
deliberately abandon a community to its enemies of the underworld 
is as grave an offense morally as for a soldier to desert his 
post." The Sun went on to urge Boston officials not to compromise 
with the striking police. The editors of the New York Times 
likewise invoked the military analogy so popular among the police 
reformers, arguing, "A policeman has no more right to belong to a 
union than a soldier or a sailor." The Philadelphia Inquirer 
wrote, "Events in Boston have amply Justified the contention that 
a body of men charged with the preservation of order has no right 
to strike." Concerning police unionism, the Los Angeles Daily 
Times declared, "When policemen and firemen are bound by oath to 
organizations suspected of incendiarism, arson and 
confiscatlon,...it follows that they become a menace to the public 
peace Instead of a protection." The newspaper's editors then urged 
the police commissioner of their own city to demand that the 
patrolmen there either abandon their union or resign from the 
police force. Even the liberal press, which normally looked 
favorably on organized labor, expressed opposition to the police
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strike. The New Republic, commenting on the policemen's attempt to 
affiliate with the A.F.L., wrote that, even though the Federation 
"is no doubt more often right than wrong in its contests," this 
did not alter the fact that "the state is not to be the Instrument 
of a class....The Boston police, and anyone who may imitate them, 
will have to be opposed." President Wilson likewise added his 
voice to those in opposition to the strikers. While touring the 
nation to promote ratification of the peace treaty negotiated at 
Versailles, Wilson took time to comment on the police strike in a 
speech he gave in Helena, Montana. The President insisted, "A 
strike of the policemen of a great city, leaving that city at the 
mercy of an army of thugs, is a crime against civilization."
Wilson added that, "the obligation of a policeman is as sacred and 
direct as the obligation of a soldier....He has no right to prefer 
any private advantage to the public safety."5
Much of the criticism of the police strike reflected the 
general fear of radicalism that had gripped the American public 
shortly after the conclusion of the First World War. This hysteria 
led many Americans to leap to the erroneous conclusion that the 
Boston Police Strike was the first step in a nationwide uprising 
by radical elements. Allusions to the Bolshevik take-over in 
Russia filled the editorials that appeared in response to the 
policemen's strike. Two days after the strike began, the Boston 
Post commented, "Boston is not Moscow and Massachusetts is not 
Russia. No soviet mob rule for us, thank you." The Evening 
Transcript declared that the police union's "attempt to overthrow
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American government hereabout is foredoomed to failure," and 
referred to the strike as "this skirmish with Bolshevism." 
Throughout the nation the response was similar. In its report on 
the disorder in Boston, the New Orleans Tlmes-Plcavune wrote, "the 
soviet spirit ran amuckf" and compared events in Boston with the 
rioting in Petrograd and Moscow. To the editors of the New York 
Times, the strike was "this Boston essay in Bolshevism." A police 
strike, the paper said, "is an imported, revolutionary idea that 
may spread to various cities." The Philadelphia Publlc Ledger 
declared, "Bolshevism in the United States is no longer a specter. 
Boston in chaos reveals its sinister substance.” The New York 
World announced, "The policemen of Boston...boldly undertook to 
set up a Soviet government which, if successful, would have been 
superior to the commonwealth.” Some federal officials even 
succumbed to the hysteria. A few days after the strike began, 
Senator Henry L. Myers of Montana contended that the unionization 
of policemen would be followed by the unionization of soldiers and 
sailors. Myers predicted that, if that were allowed to happen, "We 
will have a soviet government within two years....There will be no 
need of holding an election in 1920.” The accusation of 
Bolshevism, of course, came as a shock to the policemen, whose 
actual agenda was far less political and more limited in scope 
than that attributed to them. Nevertheless, once the striking 
policemen had been labeled radicals, few seemed willing to accept 
the less flamboyant interpretation that they were simply typical
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working-class Americans in search of a way to improve their own 
working conditions.6
Convinced that such negative publicity would undermine the 
prestige of the A.F.L., Samuel Gompers decided to involve himself 
in the police controversy in an effort to end the strike as soon 
as possible. Hoping to at least preserve the policemen/s Jobs, 
Gompers sent identical telegrams, dated September 12, to Governor 
Coolidge and to Mayor Peters requesting that they allow the 
striking policemen to return to their posts. Gompers made 
reference to President Wilson's request that enforcement of the 
anti-union regulation enacted by the Metropolitan Police 
Department of Washington be delayed until after the Industrial 
conference scheduled for October, and he appealed for a similar 
deferral in the case of the Boston patrolmen. Gompers also 
informed the officials that he planned to contact Frank McCarthy, 
the A.F.L.'s organizer in Boston, with instructions that he 
strongly recommend to the members of the Policemen's Union that 
they return to work pending settlement of the dispute. That 
evening, three days after their walkout began, the Boston 
Policemen's Union voted unanimously to follow Gompers's suggestion 
and to return to work.7
Public sentiment against the policemen, though, made it 
unlikely that any elected official would adopt the course of 
action suggested by Gompers, and Coolidge, moreover, was still 
committed to allowing the police commissioner a free hand in 
handling the crisis. In a telegram dispatched to Gompers on
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September 13, Coolidge declared, “the suggestions contained In 
your telegram are not within the Jurisdiction of the Governor of 
Massachusetts, but only of the commissioner of police of the city 
of Boston. With the maintenance of discipline in his department, I 
have no authority to interfere." That same day, Curtis issued 
general order No. 124, declaring the positions of all 1,117 
striking policemen to be vacant, and he commenced the recruitment 
of a new force.8
Upon receiving Coolldge's telegram, Gompers immediately sent 
a reply in which he repeated his appeal that the men be 
reinstated. This time, his criticism of Curtis was far sharper. 
Gompers insisted that the issue at hand was not one of law and 
order, but rather, it concerned "the assumption of an autocratic 
and unwarranted position by the commissioner of police, who is not 
responsible to the people of Boston but is appointed by you.* 
Gompers asserted, "the right of the policemen to organize has been 
denied— a right which has heretofore never been questioned."9
In his reply to Gompers, Coolidge took the opportunity to 
issue his strongest statement up to that point. He reaffirmed his 
decision to refrain from interfering with the work of the police 
commissioner, pointing out, "I have already refused to remove the 
Police Commissioner of Boston. I did not appoint him. He can 
assume no position which the Courts would uphold except what the 
people have by the authority of their law vested in him. He speaks 
only with their voice." President W1Ison's suggestion to the 
police officials in Washington, Coolidge observed, had no bearing
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on conditions in Boston because the Washington police had not gone 
on strike. In response to the claim by Gompers that the policemen 
had a right to unionize, Coolidge replied, "The right of the 
police of Boston to affiliate has always been questioned, never 
granted, is now prohibited.■ The statement that captured the 
attention of the nation, however, was Coolidge/s assertion that 
"There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, 
anywhere, any time." In one simple sentence, Coolidge had 
summarized the concerns that the entire nation had expressed 
regarding the police strike. Public response to the statement was 
overwhelming. The staunchly Republican Boston Evening Transcript 
called Coolidge's telegram "a state paper certain to enhance the 
highest traditions of the great office so worthily filled today." 
Coolidge, the paper contended, "speaks the voice of 
Massachusetts." Even the Boston Post. one of the city's leading 
Democratic papers, said that Coolidge's statement represented 
"sound doctrine," and added, "Governor Coolidge has enunciated a 
great truth in a terse phrase that will live." Coolidge's telegram 
was reprinted in newspapers throughout the nation. Within a few 
weeks the governor received 70,000 letters and telegrams 
expressing approval of his stand, and his picture appeared in over 
one thousand different publications. In spite of his belated 
involvement in the controversy, Coolidge was the one who emerged 
from it a national hero. His refusal to force Curtis to reinstate 
the striking police earned him a reputation as the man who had 
preserved law and order in Boston and, in so doing, had saved the
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entire nation from upheaval. Later, Coolidge was able to parlay 
this notoriety into a Republican Party nomination for the 
Vice-Presidency. Thus, the police strike played a significant role 
in propelling Coolidge to the White House.10
As a final blow to their cause, organized labor itself 
retreated from its original stand of unqualified support for the 
policemen. Contrary to the Impassioned pledges which they had 
offered before the strike, local labor leaders began to feel that 
associating themselves with a movement that had attracted such 
ardent public condemnation would not be in their own 
organizations' best Interests. Furthermore, Gompers himself worked 
to restrain the city's other A.F.L. affiliates. Shortly after the 
strike began, he dispatched his personal secretary, Guy Oyster, to 
Boston. Oyster met not only with Curtis and Mclnnes, but also with 
Michael O'Donnell, the President of the Boston Central Labor 
Union. In the meanwhile, an official at the A.F.L.'s headquarters 
in Washington Issued a statement which read, "Mr. Gompers does not 
want a general strike and the Federation does not want a general 
strike."11
After delaying any decision concerning a general strike for 
nearly two weeks, the leaders of the Boston Central Labor Union 
finally called a meeting at which the local unions' votes on the 
issue of a general strike were to be reported. After renewing 
pledges of financial and moral support for the striking policemen, 
O'Donnell reported that the committee created to coordinate policy 
on the strike "finds it advisable not to announce the
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organizations that have voted to participate in a general 
movement." 0/Donne 11 proceeded to declare that, in the opinion of 
the committee, "the time is not opportune for ordering a general 
strike." The meeting was adjourned without any further action, and 
a general strike was never called.12
Realizing that his own involvement in the controversy had 
only served to further damage the prestige of organized labor and, 
at the same time, had afforded opportunities for Coolidge and 
Curtis to enhance their own public stature, the President of the 
A.F.L. also began to distance himself from the strike. Less than 
two weeks after the Boston Police Strike began, Gompers testified 
at hearings before the Senate Committee on the District of 
Columbia, which was considering a bill to withhold salaries from 
any Washington policemen who belonged to a union. In his 
testimony, Gompers upheld the rights of policemen to form unions 
and to affiliate with the A.F.L. However, he also publicly 
announced that, in his opinion, policemen did not have a right to 
strike.13
The striking policemen of Boston were never permitted to 
return to their Jobs. In November 1919, Judge Carroll of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of 
mandamus which would have required Curtis to reinstate them. 
Instead, the police department recruited a brand new force. In 
order to recruit enough new policemen, however, Curtis had to ask 
the civil service commission to reduce the standards that new 
police officers were required to meet. In a further effort to
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attract applicants, the police commissioner also Insisted that the 
city improve working conditions. The department began to provide 
uniforms for the men, and the starting salary for new recruits was 
raised to $1400. This time, Mayor Peters approved the salary 
request without complaint. In a memo Issued Just four days after 
the strike began, Curtis also ordered Superintendent Michael 
Crowley to have the division captains make dally Inspections of 
the station houses and, In particular, to "see that everything is 
clean and that all vermin be exterminated." Two days later, the 
City Council authorized the preparation of plans for a new police 
station to replace the rat- and insect-infested station near City 
Hall. Ironically, then, the strike did compel officials to remedy 
some of the pollcemen/s grievances, even if the men who staged the 
walkout were never to enjoy the improved working conditions.14
The number of patrolmen on the force was increased from 1,544 
at the time of the strike to 1,614 a year later. The new force was 
hastily recruited, however, and as a result many of the new 
policemen were not able, or not inclined, to meet the demands that 
the department placed upon them. In the first 14 months following 
the strike, 253 officers resigned from the force and another 84 
were discharged. In fact, the department continued to feel the 
repercussions of the strike for the next decade. From 1894 to 
1918, an average of eight policemen had been discharged from the 
Boston Police Department each year. Between 1921 and 1928, the 
average was 25 per year. Not long after the strike, the Boston 
Police Department's reputation for excellence was gone.15
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The Boston Police Strike also had a tremendous impact on 
police departments throughout the nation. This impact was 
two-fold. First of all, like their counterparts in Boston, police 
and municipal officials in several cities, including New York and 
Washington, responded to the strike by raising salaries and 
improving working conditions. On the other hand, the strike also 
brought the police union movement to an abrupt halt. Nearly every 
police union that had affiliated with the A.F.L. either returned 
its charter voluntarily or was forced to do so by local officials. 
By the end of 1920, the A.F.L. revoked the outstanding charters, 
and the police union movement came to an end.*6
The strike had an adverse impact on the union movement within 
the ranks of other public employees as well. In February 1920, the 
A.F.L.'s official monthly publication, American Federation 1st, 
reported that within the past month alone, 23 firefighters' locals 
had disbanded. The strike also contributed to the decline of the 
American Federation of Teachers.
The legacy of the Boston Police Strike plagued attempts to 
unionize policemen for decades after the strike. When organized 
labor launched a second attempt to recruit police officers to 
their ranks In the 1940's, public officials referred repeatedly to 
the Boston Police Strike and to the subsequent disturbances in 
their efforts to block the union organizers. The same arguments 
that had been used in Boston in 1919, arguments about divided 
allegiance and the threat that unionization posed to discipline 
within the department, resurfaced when the American Federation of
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State, County and Municipal Employees, an affiliate of the A.F.L., 
attempted to organize the policemen In numerous cities. A pamphlet 
entitled Pol Ice Unions, published by the International Association 
of Police Chiefs in 1944, and then republished in 1958, included a 
lengthy account of the Boston Police Strike, focusing much of Its 
attention on the vandalism and looting that erupted as a result of 
the strike. The pamphlet Included quotes from Wilson and Coolidge 
condemning the strike, and went on to say that, through the years, 
the strike "has served as a poignant reminder to police of the 
nation that divided allegiance can bring nothing but sweeping 
public resentment and destructive criticism.- The I.A.C.P. 
concluded that "the prevalent majority opinion appears to be that 
police unions, aff11lated with trade-labor organizations, are 
contrary to the basic nature of police duties." During the 1940/s, 
patrolmen in numerous cities, including Los Angeles, Saint Louis, 
Detroit, Miami and Chicago, attempted to establish unions, but in 
nearly every case the unions were subsequently disbanded under 
threats of dismissal. Through a combination of city ordinances, 
department regulations and court decisions, the police union 
movement was again laid to rest by the end of the 1940's. Thus, 
until the 1960's, those police organizations that did exist were 
forced to remain strictly local in nature. Police unionism was not 
revived again until the 1960's and 1970's, when a new, much more 
militant mood hit the nation's police officers. This militancy 
resulted in the creation of many of the organizations, some
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independent and some affl1lated with national unions, that 
represent policemen today.18
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
The police reformers' efforts to significantly alter both 
police acknlnlstration and the policeman himself were responsible 
for the creation of a police department in Boston in which 
corruption was minimal and expectations for performance were high. 
Nevertheless, it also allowed serious problems to arise and to go 
unremedled. The reforms created a situation in which municipal 
officials and police adninlstrators came to view one another not 
as partners but as enemies, and then permitted this animosity to 
continue for decades. This persistent hostility impeded the proper 
funding of the police force, and it diverted the attention of 
officials at exactly those times when a concerted response may 
have helped to resolve problems. Reform led to the emergence of a 
police commissioner whose power within the department went 
virtually unchecked and whose accountability to anyone outside the 
department was minimal. This autonomy meant that the department's 
ability to serve the interests of the community or to maintain an 
acceptable level of morale within its ranks was, to a large 
degree, dependent upon the personal characteristics of the 
commissioner in charge at the moment. Stephen O'Meara was able to 
fulfill the obligations of such a role quite successfully. Edwin 
Curtis was not. Thus, reform failed to create a command structure 
capable of maintaining a level of effectiveness that was reliably 
high and transferable from one achnlnlstration to another. Finally,
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professionalization placed increasing, and often conflicting, 
demands on the policeman at the same time that it instilled in him 
the notion that police work was a noble, life-long career rather 
than just a Job. Together, these factors created a police force 
that was keenly aware of the inadequacies of its working 
conditions and willing to take action to remedy the situation. The 
professional ideal, however, severely limited the range of action 
that the policeman could legitimately take in pursuit of his own 
Interests. The reformers'' intent was for professionalization to 
produce a highly dedicated and disciplined police force. In 
Boston, it created one that was frustrated and willing to rebel 
against its commanders.
Thus, a number of forces came together to spark the chain of 
events that culminated in the strike by the Boston police. Rivalry 
among various government officials, the unrestrained power of the 
police commissioner and the growing frustration of the patrolmen, 
all of which were interrelated, laid the groundwork for the crisis 
that ensued. The deterioration of the patrolmen's economic 
position during and after the First World War and the simultaneous 
lure of a successful organized labor movement then provided the 
impetus for the action that brought the tension within the 
department to a head and brought the problems of the 
widely-acclaimed police department to light. Finally, the 
long-standing animosity between city and police officials, 
compounded by the police commissioner's autonomy, undermined the 
efforts to reach a compromise that may have averted the strike in
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much the seme way that the settlement proposed by the mayor of 
Cincinnati had ended the strike by that city's policemen one year 
earlier.
The goal of police reform had been to create a police force 
that would more effectively serve the needs of the community, or, 
more accurately, would serve the needs of the community as they 
were defined by the reformers. The needs of the policemen who were 
expected to provide this service were not attended to, nor did the 
reformers feel they warranted consideration. As a result, police 
reform often created conditions that were detrimental to the 
policeman's interests. The resultant frustration was further 
compounded by the stress that was generated when a polIce force 
recruited from the working class was expected to display behaviors 
and attitudes that differed dramatically from those 
characteristically expected from other members of that class. 
Originally, the reformers held the view that the policeman was 
simply to accept this frustration as the price he paid for the 
honor of serving his city. Their devotion to the concept of the 
policeman as an obedient, self-sacrificing servant of the 
community, however, prevented the reformers from addressing the 
fact that a disgruntled police force cannot provide a city with 
adequate protection.
In Boston, this frustration erupted into a conflict in which 
the public's interests were endangered, thus proving that, at 
times, it is in the best interests of the public to attend to the 
interests of the public servant. This lesson was not lost on the
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officials throughout the nation who responded to the Boston Police 
Strike by improving working conditions within their police 
departments. Nor was it lost on at least some of the police 
reformers. Writing after the Boston Police Strike, Raymond Fosdick 
reiterated the idea that the rights to strike or to affiliate with 
labor unions were incompatible with the policeman's duty to serve 
the community. He then proceeded to point out, however, that the 
community has its own duty to the policeman. Fosdick found the low 
pay, long hours, and unsanitary station houses that characterized 
many police departments to be inexcusable. He observed:
If the police may not strike to improve their 
situation, and if they may not affiliate with 
organized labor, then the community that employs 
them owes them a responsibility which up to the 
present time, certainly, it has not fulfilled. It 
cannot strip them of the weapons of defense which 
other workers have, and at the same time ignore 
their just claims because they are merely pressed 
by argument.1
In the midst of the Boston Police Strike, the editors of the 
Boston Globe showed that they had come to a similar realization.
In rejecting the policemen's bid to affiliate with the American 
Federation of Labor, the Globe argued, "We are only lately emerged 
from a long struggle to rescue the police in this country from the 
control of political parties and to place them on a footing of 
self-respecting independence....The people would not consent to 
see them pass into a new partisanship." However, the Globe 
continued:
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Since It claims a special duty of [the policeman], 
the public owes a special duty to him....When the 
old spoils system was in vogue, the spoilsmen in 
City Councils and Congress looked out for their 
appointees in office, and a generation ago a 
Government Job was among the best-paid 
employments. This is no longer true, and we are to 
blame for this.2
Thus, the police strike seems to have produced at least some 
awareness of the fact that, lofty sentiments of the professional 
ideal aside, police work must meet not only the community's need 
for the maintenance of law and order, but also the policeman's 
need to support his family and to derive adequate satisfaction 
from his work. The Boston Police Strike proved that a community 
must find a way to maintain an acceptable balance between these 
two sets of demands if it is to enjoy the benefits of effective 
police protection.
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